SEP 2 3 1982
Y4.F76/2:M58/21

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

COMPLETED ORIGINAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 15, 1982

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Y4.F76/2:M58/21

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-794 O WASHINGTON: 1982

I

ORIGINAL

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois, *Chairman*

HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee	CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
S. I. HAYAKAWA, California	JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana	PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland	EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas	PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota	ALAN CRANSTON, California
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota	CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

EDWARD G. SANDERS, *Staff Director*
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, *Minority Staff Director*

CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing day:	
July 15, 1982	1
Statement of—	
Allen, Hon. Richard, former National Security Adviser	9
Ball, Hon. George W., former Under Secretary of State	2
Insertions for the record:	
A reply to critics: Morality and the war—reprinted from the New York Times, July 15, 1982	15
Israelis in Lebanon: Indications of unease in America—criticism of Israel among U.S. Jews seems to be rising—reprinted from the New York Times, July 15, 1982	16
Israel: Recollections and regrets—reprinted from the Washington Post, June 29, 1982	24

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Tsongas, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not suppose the timing of these hearings could have been much better. We did not plan on it being in this kind of perilous, precipitous situation in the Middle East, but I think the committee and the American public will be particularly illuminated by the judgments rendered this morning by two men who have spent a great deal of time thinking about the problems of the Middle East and who have had access to the highest councils in several administrations.

This morning, we begin a series of hearings on the current situation in the Middle East. The hearings will explore the wide range of policy choices available to the United States during this unusual period of rapidly changing political conditions. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iranian attack into Iraq are creating new circumstances in the Middle East which could influence vital American interests for the foreseeable future.

The approach adopted during the next several months will have to be carefully forged and pursued if we and our friends are to realize political opportunities and avoid potential disasters.

Today we are fortunate to have two distinguished statesmen who have considerable experience addressing the problems of the region. George Ball, former Under Secretary of State, has long experience in the Middle East and is recognized as one of the most outspoken critics of some aspects of American policy. Richard Allen, former National Security Adviser to President Ronald Reagan and currently senior counselor for foreign policy and national security affairs at the Republican National Committee, was a prime actor in formulating Reagan administration policy toward the Middle East.

We look forward very much to hearing your views.

Senator Pell, I would call upon you for any comments you would care to make.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you say, we have been following closely the developments in Lebanon and the Middle East. Some of us have been there recently. I think Senator Dodd was there just a few days ago. I was there several weeks ago. Lord knows, it is a very difficult and very tough situation indeed.

I am amongst those who indicated support of the President's sending the Marines into Lebanon, provided there was agreement on the part of the four parties involved—the Syrians, Lebanese, Israelis, and PLO. Since the time this proposal was made, two of the parties seem to have withdrawn their support for it, the Syrians and the PLO. The agreement is obviously very moot and it would seem very unlikely at this time that all the four parties would agree.

If they do, though, then I think anything we can do to further the withdrawal of all troops from Lebanon is the correct course for us to follow.

I also believe, too, that the changed situation in Lebanon may open the way to resolution of the Palestinian autonomy issue. It is very important that we make clear to both Egypt and Israel our deep interest in a serious effort to find a workable solution for the West Bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem.

As a sign of their good intent, the Israelis should cease the expansion and enlargement of their civilian settlements in the occupied territories while the discussions are going on concerning autonomy. This was a suggestion that Senator Javits made and it was related to the committee through you, Mr. Chairman. It seems like an excellent suggestion.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Secretary Ball, we would be pleased to have you start off.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is George W. Ball and I appear here this morning in a purely personal capacity. I do not represent any group, organization, or institution. I take sole responsibility for the views I shall present to this committee. They reflect my experience as Under Secretary of State from 1961 to 1966 and as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 1968. They embody the conclusions I have reached from studying and writing about the Middle East for many years.

The burden of my comments this morning is that our country urgently needs to recast its relations with Israel. Those relations are untenable because they lack the essential ingredient of effective collaboration. Nations can work together usefully only if they share at least the key elements of a common strategy and there is substantial congruence, not merely in their national interests but in their governments' definitions of their respective national interests.

That can be assured only if mutual dealings are conducted with complete frankness and straightforwardness—a state of affairs that has never existed between the Israeli and American Governments.

The central flaw in our relations with Israel developed long before the Begin regime. On repeated occasions during the last quarter century, Israeli leaders have taken the United States by surprise, secretly launching military adventures without regard to their effect on America's plans or concerns. They have mounted those adventures stealthily because, as they well knew, the United States would object were our Government informed in advance.

Such furtive conduct began at least as early as 1956, when Israel connived with the French and British Governments to attack Suez. In 1967 Israel again invaded Egypt, to the surprise of our Government, which was still hoping to solve the threatening problems through diplomatic means. In June last year, Israel bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor, risking in the process a disastrous compromise of the secret technology of some of America's most sophisticated weapons—our F–15's and E–16's—one or more of which might well have flamed out or been shot down over Iraq. A month later, it again shocked America by bombing a residential area in Beirut, killing an estimated 300 people, mostly civilians.

It chose June of this year, when the President was in Versailles and world attention was still focused on the Falkland crisis, to create a pretext to invade Lebanon. Nor was that the end of it, for, contrary to Mr. Begin's assurance that Israeli troops would not invade beyond a line 25 miles north of its border, the Israeli Army kept going all the way to Beirut, while the guns and planes we supplied continued to bomb refugee camps, civilian apartment houses, and densely settled urban centers. Though Mr. Begin, at the President's urging, promised that Israel would not invade Beirut, the army still kept moving closer toward the city center, smashing dwellings in West Beirut with tragic civilian carnage.

Such a protracted sequence of events has established a pattern so routine as to be taken for granted. First, Israel embarks secretly on a military adventure at a carefully chosen time when America's attention is focused elsewhere. Second our Government responds, if at all, by mild threats both sides know will never be carried out. Third, when the Israeli Government reacts in anger to our threats, we appease it by providing more planes, guns, tanks, and economic help.

Not since 1957 has the United States required Israel to undo the damage caused by one of its adventures. Following the attack on Suez, France and Britain withdrew their forces in response to a United Nations resolutions back by the United States. But Israel, the third conspirator, refused to follow suit. Instead, it made a series of tactical token withdrawals, while Prime Minister Ben Gurion announced in the Knesset on November 7, 1956, that since the Sinai was historically a part of Israel there had been no invasion of Egypt, just as Prime Minister Begin is asserting that there has been no invasion of Lebanon.

Finally, 5 months after the invasion, President Eisenhower forced the Israeli Government, kicking and screaming, to obey the United Nations resolution and withdraw its forces. The lever he used was an irreversible decision to cut off all American aid to Israel if it did not comply with the United Nations resolution.

That was the last time any American President has shown the political fortitude to take a firm position against Israeli intransigence. Since then, Israel has persistently flouted the United Nations, counting on the United States to use its veto in the Security Council to save Israel from censure and economic sanctions. Indeed, just this last month, our country stood isolated against all other nations to cast a lone vote that vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its troops from Lebanon.

By consistently scuttling all U.N. efforts to deal effectively with Middle East issues, we have strongly encouraged the impression that

the United Nations is merely an impotent "talking shop." It is ironical that our own permanent representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, is the most outspoken exponent of that view.

After the 1967 war, the United States negotiated the adoption of Resolution 242 by the United Nations Security Council, which called for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory to deliberately ambiguous "secure and recognized boundaries." But, abandoning Eisenhower's practice of insisting that Security Council resolutions be enforced, we have meekly let Israel impede carrying out of that resolution by a settlements policy that amounts to a creeping absorption of the occupied areas.

Faced with only an occasional plaintive protest from the United States, the Begin government has defied Resolution 242 by establishing its headquarters in Jerusalem, annexing the Golan Heights, preempting 40 percent of the West Bank's land and water supply, and proclaiming that the West Bank is a part of Israel by virtue of history and religious title deeds 3,000 years old.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon is thus only one more event in a long series. Though Israeli weapons have devastated large areas of the country and killed and wounded a shockingly large, though still undetermined, number of innocent civilians, the Reagan administration has responded with a strange and unbecoming silence. Israel remains for it the spoiled child of our foreign policy, to be propitiated by almost unlimited indulgence.

Such discriminatory treatment undercuts our pretensions to fair-mindedness. Imagine the outcry if the British Government, for example, were to use its own weapons, much less those given it by America, to devastate Northern Ireland so as to wipe out an IRA that was planting bombs in London. Or consider, what is perhaps even more relevant, the angry American outcry if, during Britain's Palestinian mandate, British guns and planes had shelled and bombed a crowded town to try to capture the leaders of the terrorist organization Irgun Leumi which Mr. Begin then headed.

But we need not rely on mere hypothetical speculations. We can gain perspective from actual historical events. When, in 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus to save the Turkish Cypriot community from brutal attacks by the Greek Cypriot Government, the United States suspended all military assistance to Turkey for 2 years on the grounds that the Turks had illegally used weapons we had given them for self-defense.

Although in attacking Beirut, the Israeli Government has a far weaker case for claiming self-defense than did the Turks, I have not even heard a whisper suggesting that we cut off the further flow of arms to Israel. Instead, our Government has apparently promised them 75 more planes.

What, then, must the world conclude? That the powerful Greek lobby could persuade the bureaucracy to penalize Turkey for misusing our weapons, while the even more powerful Israeli lobby can protect Israel from the logic of American law?

I find the administration's position on these matters totally baffling. Instead of trying to stop Israel from rampaging over Lebanon, the administration has seemed to regard Israel's bloody invasion as a good thing. Indeed, one hears much foolish talk that the decimation of the PLO leadership may provide a "new opportunity for peace." Just how

that will come about is not clear, but it calls to mind the Caledonian General Galgacus, who said of the Romans after the disastrous battle of Mons Graupius: "They make a desert and call it peace."

History has repeatedly shown the consequences of creating martyrs on a massive scale, as the Israeli army and air force have been doing. It guarantees increased violence and fanatical resistance.

Those who argue otherwise gravely understate the deep passion that underlies the cause of the Palestinian people, several million of whom, almost 40 years after the creation of Israel, are still in a diaspora, deprived of a homeland, and with their homes and refugee camps now subjected to shelling and bombing, while those remaining in the West Bank suffer the slow agony of seeing their water supply gradually preempted by Israeli settlements and their property taken over by the Israelis.

Our most valuable asset is our standing as a nation and a people committed to justice and humanity, and we diminish ourselves when we allow our weapons, including cluster bombs, to be used in Israel's sanguinary adventure without even a whimper of protest. We are made to appear as an accessory to Israel's brutal invasion, or at least as a nation too weak and irresolute to restrain a client state whose military strength largely derives from our gift of deadly arms and whose economic life depends on the constant blood transaction of our economic aid.

No doubt it would be pleasant to think that the Israeli devastation of Lebanon would contribute to a solution of the festering Palestinian issue, which is the heart of the Arab-Israeli dispute. But Prime Minister Begin has turned his back on his Camp David commitment of autonomy for the Palestinians, reducing that concept, which once seemed to hold promise as a transition step toward ultimate self-determination, to little more than an Israeli version of apartheid. With the radicalization of young Palestinians speeded by Lebanon's destruction, where are the Palestinian Quislings to be found who will be willing to accept autonomy arrangements developed on anything like the Begin model?

America's distorted relations with Israel illustrate a phenomenon familiar in American politics: that a democratic government does not easily break free from habits of thought and action that have long shaped its policies and readjust those policies when the factual situation is radically altered.

From the moment it acquired statehood, Israel was besieged by enemies, and since its survival was unquestionably at stake we Americans quite understandably favored it in every way, responding with an extraordinary generosity that has steadily increased as Israel's political influence has mounted. By providing massive economic and military help, we have made possible the transformation of Israel into a formidable warrior state. Armed with vast quantities of America's most advanced weapons, it has not only achieved military security but has become by far the most powerful military nation in the area, to the point where its neighbors fear it far more than it fears them.

Thus, our first step in shaping a Middle East policy that will advance and protect our indispensable national interests is to acknowledge that Israel is no longer a weak, beleaguered state menaced by powerful enemies on all sides. Yet, we have never seriously tried to

96-794 O - 82 - 2

adjust our policies to this change in circumstances, seeming quite insensitive to the fact that during the time Israel, with our massive help, has been building impressive military might, the Camp David accords have, by neutralizing Israel's most formidable antagonist, Egypt, relieved it of the threat of a two-front war.

The result is what some of us have feared ever since Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, that the bilateral approach of an Egyptian-Israeli deal would, by reducing the pressure on Israel, encourage the Begin government to expansionist policies. Thus today, rather than seriously trying to resolve the Palestinian problem, Israel is seeking to annex the occupied areas by systematically creating what it calls new facts. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that it seems bent on installing a Maronite, or at least a Phalangist, Lebanese Government it can effectively influence.

The invasion of Lebanon was not a defensive action. It was an attempt to crush the only legitimate and recognized Palestinian opposition, so that Israel could proceed unchallenged to absorb the occupied areas. That is the situation today, and that ambition is not confined to the Begin government. The situation would only grow worse were Gen. Ariel Sharon to succeed to power. In my own conversations with him in Israel, Sharon gave me the distinct impression that his long-range strategy was to push the Palestinians out of the West Bank, keeping, as he told one of my friends, "only enough for labor."

All too often when we Americans discuss the resolution of the problems of the Middle East, someone tries to terminate the discussion with the comment that "Israel would never agree to that." It is a habit we should break. U.S. Middle East policy has marched to an Israeli drum far too long, as though we were powerless to pursue a course of our own.

Our foreign friends are amazed at our attitude. They know that we are now, and have been for several years, supplying Israel with economic and military assistance at a rate of roughly $7 million a day, the equivalent of $3,500 to $4,000 a year for every family of five in Israel. Why then do we think we lack the leverage to dissuade Israel from pursuing willful policies obnoxious to our interests?

Such a confession of impotence is not only unworthy of a great nation; it is quite unfounded in fact or experience, as President Eisenhower demonstrated in 1957. After all, there is nothing in our Constitution that requires the American taxpayer to dole out $2.5 billion a year to a nation that repeatedly ignores our interests. In shaping our national budget, we do not treat the claims of America's poor as so sacrosanct.

Let me be quite clear. I am not at all opposed to our aiding Israel. But that aid should be provided in the context of a self-respecting relationship. Nor do I have any doubt that such a self-respecting relationship with Israel is possible. That we have not up to now insisted on it is our own fault.

If we are to continue our present massive subsidy to Israel, we must develop some adequate guidelines. At the minimum, we must require: first, that Israel consult fully with us before undertaking military operations with the weapons we have provided; second, that Israel terminate the settlements policy which is not only illegal but

amounts to a de facto repudiation of Resolution 242 and impedes, if it does not preclude, a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Let me add one final comment on a question that I know is of immediate concern to this committee. Should America commit its marines to facilitate the removal of the PLO leaders from Beirut? There are, it seems to me, at least two good reasons why such a deployment would be extremely ill-advised.

First, other nations would interpret such an action as confirming the already widespread suspicion that the United States conspired with Israel to launch the Lebanese invasion. In assisting in removing the PLO leaders, we would appear to be acting as an accessory to Israel's grand design.

Instead, we should show our displeasure at the arrogance with which the Israel Government keeps pressing our negotiators, asserting that it is "losing patience" and that if the American mediators do not hurry up and procure an agreement within a few days Israel will use the lethal arms we have given it to destroy West Beirut and kill more innocent civilians. Why do we supinely accept such an ultimatum? It is humiliating and absurb in view of Israel's dependence on us. Indeed we should make it quite clear that if they use the weapons we have provided to attack West Beirut our aid will be terminated.

Second, we would imprudently hazard the lives of our marines to commit them to an area where anti-Americanism is a dominating sentiment. To be sure, we may facilitate the removal of PLO leaders, but there will be plenty of frustrated Palestinians left behind and many may be driven to desperate acts of terrorism by the atmosphere of death and violence that has enveloped the city. If there must be some third party intervention, let the troops of other nations undertake it—young men who are not Americans and hence not the natural targets for assassins.

Obviously, I do not know the current state of Ambassador Habib's negotiations and it may be that our commitment of troops cannot be reversed. But in that case we should, as the price of our commitment, require Prime Minister Begin to promise in unambiguous words in writing that he will get on promptly with a good faith effort to provide genuine autonomy to the occupied areas, while at the same time we should make it clear that we shall hereafter feel free to talk or negotiate with any Palestinian representatives we choose.

The Middle East is at the moment the strategic center of the world, a turbulent area where our interests are not only vital but currently in jeopardy. Thus we can no longer afford to neglect a principle essential to an effective foreign policy: That our control of decisions and actions affecting our interests must be equal in extent and magnitude to our responsibilities.

Today our interests can be seriously damaged by reckless Israeli actions, particularly since the world holds us responsible for the consequences of Israel's military adventures. Yet we are not even given the courtesy of advance notice. That I submit, Mr. Chairman, is intolerable, and if we are to regain a self-respecting posture as a great nation we must pursue one of two courses of action: Either Israel must categorically agree that it will not move militarily without full consultation with us or we must disengage from our present paternalistic

relation and treat Israel as any other nation in the area. To sort out that relationship and make the hard choice I have suggested should in my view be Secretary Shultz's most urgent task.

I have in the course of my comments, Mr. Chairman, suggested a number of changes that are essential to put America's relations with Israel into phase with today's realities. But if I may shift for a moment from the role of advocate to that of prophet, I must tell you sadly that I do not think any of my suggestions will be adopted. Habits have been too firmly engrained and institutional resistance has become too powerful.

Thus, I would predict that:

In spite of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the United States will give Israel the 75 additional F–16's it has requested;

In spite of the current depression, Congress will insist on increasing Israel's subsidy beyond even that requested by the President;

No serious effort will be made to prevent further Israeli surprises that stultify America's own diplomacy;

No effective measures will be taken to stop the Israeli settlements program which is making a mockery of the Camp David agreements;

The United States will continue to observe its self-imposed inhibition against negotiating with the PLO, who are the only legitimate spokesmen for the Palestinians;

And if any progress is made toward autonomy for the peoples of the West Bank, it will be a travesty of real autonomy.

Now, let me add two more lugubrious prophecies: The United States will provide major economic aid to rebuild those huge areas of Lebanon devastated by our own guns and planes manned by Israelis; and a year from now, our Government will be making feeble protests against an Israeli settlements policy aimed at preempting the land and water of Lebanon at least as far north as the Litani River.

I hope I am wrong in these predictions, Mr. Chairman. I profoundly hope that I am wrong, but there is nothing in the past record to encourage hope. I hope I am wrong because our shocking abdication of responsibility is, in my view, a road toward disaster, not only for the United States but for Israel.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Ball.

Dr. Allen, your statement is considerably shorter. The committee would be happy to yield to you equal time if you want to expand on your comments.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I am sure the ingredients of an interesting discussion are now in place, with Secretary Ball's very interesting statement, and I will take your time only to read the brief remarks that I have prepared and then allow for an expanded discussion of some of the points that were made in both of these statements at your convenience.

The CHAIRMAN. Your characterization of the statement as an interesting statement is like looking at a baby and saying, that is some baby.

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I am sure we will get to all of these points in due course, Mr. Chairman. And with your permission, I will elaborate in my remarks.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, do we have copies of Mr. Ball's statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we do have copies. Here is one for you right here.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD ALLEN, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

The situation in the Middle East today is critical and requires the urgent attention of U.S. policymakers. The purpose of an inquiry into this situation by the Senate, as a contribution to the policymaking process, is to assist it in understanding the origins of the problem, to provide a public forum for discussion and debate leading to a clear exposition of the range of policy options, and to convey these considerations and guidance to the executive branch.

There is widespread disagreement in the United States today about the posture of the United States in the present crisis, and this disagreement extends to the range of policy choices designed to reduce tensions in the region and hopefully to contribute to the elusive but widely shared goal of a just and lasting peace.

As I see it, Israel's move into Lebanon was motivated by a growing concern about her security and the result of increasing frustration over the dangerous and deteriorating situation in Lebanon itself. The goal of establishing a cordon sanitaire, understood by some to be the limit of Israel military objectives, quickly expanded to include measures against the PLO structures and the removal of the Syrian Armed Forces. The Israeli military thrust has been accompanied by regrettable loss of life.

What happens now? Our broad interests in the Middle East are complex and interrelated, and your detailed examination of the options will, I hope, point to some realistic solutions.

For my part, I believe that the events of the past 5 weeks permits us to assess the potential for peace under circumstances which have changed in a dramatic and important way. I believe that an important opportunity for U.S. diplomacy has been created, and that we should take advantage of that opportunity. The opportunity has several facets, all of which have important implications for our policy interests:

First, a moment has been created in which we can envisage for the first time in years a free and independent Lebanon. Indeed, as Senator George Mitchell put it:

> The revival and reestablishment of a freely independent and democratic Lebanon, with full control over her own territory, with full control over her duly authorized armed forces, and without the destabilizing presence of professional terrorists in her countryside and towns.

Second, based on many of the reports we now have, the people of Lebanon are decisively opposed to the continuing presence of PLO and Syrian troops on Lebanese soil. We should not seek to create conditions which would in any way provide for the continued presence of those forces in Lebanon.

Third, the military balance in the entire region now appears in a different light, due principally to the demonstrated superiority of U.S. armaments in the hands of highly trained forces, while the military

reputation and credibility of those who were equipped with Soviet arms of all description has suffered immeasurably.

Fourth, the inability of the Palestine Liberation Organization to generate support among the Arab countries, much less find anyone willing to accept its troops, undermines its claims to legitimacy as the authentic and sole spokesman for the Palestinian people.

And fifth, the United States retains the initiative and momentum in Middle East diplomacy today. Because of this clear situation, Mr. Chairman, we can now work toward the completion of the Camp David process by imparting new momentum to the difficult question of autonomy. This will be the most delicate task of all, but we cannot afford to waste time. The opportunity is now.

These facts are, I believe, clearly recognized by our new Secretary of State, George Shultz. He is a man who, apart from his obvious determination to join the Reagan team and to help formulate and implement the President's policy, brings to his post a wealth of experience in the troubled Middle East. Indeed, while in office I consulted with him on numerous occasions and I respect his deep concern for our vital interests and our heavy commitments in the area.

The bottom line is that, despite the potential for continued and perhaps even expanded conflict in the Middle East today, opportunity also beckons the United States. To waste this opportunity, to fail to take advantage of changed circumstances, would constitute a serious setback to American foreign policy interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I would like to put a few questions to both of you. I may be somewhat influenced in some of my thinking by a breakfast meeting this morning with Assistant Secretary Gene Dewey and Peter McPherson, Director of AID, who have just returned from the tragic situation in Lebanon.

First, from the standpoint of our relationship with Israel, on December 29 our U.S. Ambassador and I did have the privilege of spending 3 hours with Prime Minister Begin at his home. We spent a great deal of time talking about the relatively low state of relationships between the United States and Israel, which I reported at that time were at the lowest level since 1956 and I saw a steady erosion. I did not anticipate as much erosion as has even occurred since then.

We tried at that time to define the relationship between two friends, friendly nations that have been partners. I emphasized strongly the element of surprise, a word that you have used, Secretary Ball. Certainly we do not wish to invade the sovereignty of any nation, as we seem to be on the pipeline situation in Europe, and I feel that we should certainly stay out of sovereign areas, and we certainly should of Israel.

But whenever our role, which Israel has asked us to assume in the peacemaking process or when our credibility is undercut with Israel's neighbors in the Middle East is involved, I feel the element of surprise should be eliminated. And whenever the U.S. interests are vitally affected, we should then have a full and frank discussion, just as we, in Congress, have tried to establish that relationship with every administration.

This element of surprise is sometimes present when the executive branch takes an action, where they need money, support or backup, and we are just taken by surprise by the administration. This com-

mittee has worked hard to eliminate that element of surprise. Senator Glenn was in the forefront for a few years, insisting that we be treated as full partners and not taken by surprise. We have gained, I think, bipartisan support for cooperation between the administration and Congress.

Could you both comment on the damage done when time after time our interests are undercut and our support is eroded when we are taken by surprise? Would it not have been better in the case of Lebanon, that the element of surprise should have been removed? Should there not have been discussion and consultation?

Secretary Ball?

Mr. BALL. If the United States is to take the responsibility for trying to conduct a coherent diplomacy to bring about peace in the Middle East, then it must be confident that the nation which is the closest to it and for which it feels the greatest responsibility is not going to pursue a very different policy, quite secretly, and confront us on one occasion after another with situations where measures we were pursuing become irrelevant because they have been undercut.

It is as simple as that, I think, Mr. Chairman. It is solely a question of whether a coherent diplomacy is possible for the United States. I do not think we have had a coherent diplomacy for a very long time, and I think that the situation is accentuated now, after the Camp David accords have relieved Israel of any serious military danger and it need no longer be on the defensive because Egypt has been neutralized, that we have got to come to some kind of an agreement or revise substantially our relations with Israel.

We cannot be in this position where we have responsibilities, where our weapons are used, where the assumption around the world is that we are conniving with Israel in its enterprises, where in the U.N. we stand alone against the rest of the world and defend Israel, and at the same time have Israel pursue a foreign policy of her own which is contrary to our principles.

The whole business of the preemption of the West Bank, the whole business of the annexation of the Golan Heights, the establishment of a position in Jerusalem, east Jerusalem, would seem to preclude any serious diplomacy. All of this is very deleterious to our point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Allen, as National Security Adviser to the President you were in a position to have to respond to certain surprises. How do you feel about this issue?

Mr. ALLEN. Senator Percy, your question really contains two elements. One was an observation about the state of our relations with Israel generally, and you noted that they seemed to be in a condition of tension when you met with Prime Minister Begin and Ambassador Lewis on December 29. I think that there may be something to that. Relations with Israel may indeed be tense.

But we have that impression, and at the same time we have poll after poll here in the United States emphasizing the strong support of the American people for Israel in general. I do not believe you can construe that strong support to be at the same time support for each and every action that Israel takes. I find in my reading of the polls that, while there are some questions about the basic relationship between the two governments, support for Israel is increasing all the

time. And I think that reflects a view on the part of the American people that Israel is faced with a nearly insoluble security problem.

While Israel has performed superbly in military terms in recent weeks, I do not believe this performance addressed the real questions at the heart of long-range security for Israel.

The second aspect of your question dealt with the element of surprise. Obviously, the element of surprise is something that we do not welcome. We were surprised, for example, by the Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor last year.

I was surprised only by the timing of the Israeli actions that began in June. It was abundantly clear to me, based on our intelligence reports and based on the good analytical stories in the press, that it would be a matter of time before Israel would be forced, in her view, to act to protect her security interests. While abroad, when I heard of the first actions being undertaken by Israel in Lebanon, my reaction was one of surprise only at the timing and not at the actual event itself.

Whether the element of surprise by Israel is something that directly thwarts and undercuts our interests ought to be the purpose of this hearing, and not prejudged.

I firmly believe that Israel is an ally of the United States; it is a strong democracy requiring our support and our constant attention; that Israel does not always perceive its interests to be identical in the short run with those of the United States, but in the long run Israel will stand side by side with the United States. There will inevitably be ups and downs in this relationship.

Mr. Ball expressed his extreme displeasure about this condition that does not lead Israel to synchronize and coordinate its activities with the United States at all times. But I do not believe that all of our allies perform in perfect coordination, and I gather that it is the impression of the committee and certainly Mr. Ball that if all of our allies were to behave as Israel occasionally does, we would have very few real alliances.

The situation in the Middle East, in my view, is different. It is qualitatively and quantitatively different, and I believe it requires a good understanding of the long-range needs of Israel.

This is an issue, as you well know, Mr. Chairman, that is fraught with domestic political implications as well. It becomes mixed with domestic policies, and sometimes heated and unfair exchanges take place. I regret that.

As an example, I was charged with the responsibility of helping to shepherd through the Congress, working closely with you particularly, Mr. Chairman, the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. I believe that was a wise decision, but it had important domestic political implications. I believe that the events now taking place in the Middle East, not only in Lebanon but also elsewhere, reflect this continuing linkage of foreign policy and domestic politics.

It is to reduce the element of surprise that we should work very hard, I think, in persuading Israel and all our friends in the Middle East, all the moderate nations, to work together in a spirit of cooperation with the United States to find solutions to these problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Allen and Mr. Ball, I would like to ask both of you another question that I discussed at great length and detail with Prime Minister Begin. I thought we had reached an understanding both on surprises, only to find subsequently that we apparently did not have an understanding, though I thought it had been nailed down quite tightly.

The question is of defensive use of weaponry. We have had an agreement since 1952, and I am shocked to find that our two nations have a totally different understanding as to what the language of the law means. Do you feel that the time has arrived when we should define what defensive use of American weaponry is? Do you feel that there may have been a violation? Do you feel that there actually has been a violation?

It is a question the President will be required by law to answer to this committee, and regretfully it has taken the administration longer than any administration in past history to answer the question.

Mr. ALLEN. I believe that there is a compelling case, Senator, that the use of weaponry, both in the past and in recent months, does not comport with the law as it is now written. And I believe that some urgent definition, or perhaps redefinition of the law must now take place. Perhaps that is one very useful function that these hearings perform.

We do have obvious and overriding long-range strategic interests in the Middle East; I am sure every member of the committee would agree with that. Let us then write laws that in fact will be enforced and will be understood in the same way by all parties concerned.

I note among the news reports—I have no other way of verifying this—that weapons destined for other Arab countries turned up in Lebanon, that there was equipment from all nations, but that in the case of most equipment found there, the instructions and materials accompanying it was in English, indicating the origin of those weapons may have been the United States.

This must not be swept under the rug, either. This must be investigated, in my view, in great detail.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure I understood whether you did feel that there may have been a violation and in fact whether there was a violation.

Mr. ALLEN. I think it is clear that in terms of the law as it is now written we have to examine this matter carefully. I am not a legal scholar or a lawyer, but an ordinary reading of the law would indicate that there is obviously some tension between the use of those weapons by Israel and the law as it is written. I think we need to illuminate the meaning of the law, and to arrive at an understanding with all recipients of American weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Ball, if you could answer the question.

We will extend the time for each of the Senators because of the length of time we have taken on this question.

Mr. BALL. Well, lacking Mr. Allen's genius for periphrasis, I would say that there was a very clear violation. I am by training a common law lawyer. I, therefore, am to some extent governed by precedent. Look at the Turkish situation, where we suspended military assistance

96-794 O - 82 - 3

for 2 long years and very seriously impaired our relations with Turkey, perhaps almost irretrievably. How we could do that to Turkey and then simply avert our eyes when Israel repeatedly uses our weapons in a way that we cannot regard as defensive, I do not know.

That is one of the things that not only baffles me, but let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, it baffles the rest of the world. If you go to Europe or the Far East and you talk to our friends there, they do not understand it. They simply assume that the United States with respect to Israel is powerless, for political reasons.

Mr. ALLEN. May I add, Mr. Chairman, that not all our allies feel the same way. I have just returned from a trip that has taken me around the world and permitted me to confer with representatives of many countries, some in government and some not in government.

I believe that there is at least as much understanding for Israel's perceived need for security abroad as there is here in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. I am going to yield to Senator Tsongas. but just a clarification here. I am not sure I completely understand your position on this, Dick. You talked about internally in this country the need to clarify the law.

Do you think the law was clearly understood by Israel? Do you feel they violated the terms of the agreement with Israel as understood at the time those sales took place?

Mr. ALLEN. As I indicated, Senator Glenn, I think there is a compelling case that those weapons were not used in consonance with the law.

Senator GLENN. Do you think there was a violation?

Mr. ALLEN. My personal opinion is that the compelling case is on the affirmative side, that there was.

Senator GLENN. There was a violation in this case? Thank you.

I will yield the rest of my time.

Mr. ALLEN. May I add, though, that there is the extenuating circumstance in the case of Lebanon in which Lebanon, occupied by the PLO and by Syrian troops, clearly needed attention from the Israeli point of view, and the Israelis undertook their military action with the express purpose of dealing with that situation.

I believe that peace will come to Lebanon only when the PLO and the Syrian troops are out of Lebanon entirely.

Senator GLENN. I do not disagree, and I have other questions later. But Senator Tsongas has to leave and I have agreed to give him my time on the first round.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. I thank the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that two articles that appear in today's paper be included in the record. One basically takes the Israeli position, an editorial by Robert Tucker, who is a professor at Johns Hopkins; and the second, an article entitled "Criticism of Israel Among U.S. Jews Seem To Be Rising." I think they give both sides of the story rather well.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be entered into the record.

[The articles referred to follow:]

[From the New York Times, July 15, 1982]

A Reply to Critics: Morality and the War

(By Robert W. Tucker)

WASHINGTON.—"That war is just which is necessary," Livy said. Was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon necessary? Critics of the action have insistently raised this question, and, for the most part, have answered it negatively. Israel, they say, had no need to invade Lebanon to protect its northern settlements against the rockets and artillery of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The cease-fire was holding. It was broken by the Palestine Liberation Organization only in response to Israeli aerial bombardment of P.L.O. camps. There was no immediate danger to northern Israel that left only the alternative of overwhelming military action.

Moreover, the argument runs, even if a case of sorts is conceded for the move against P.L.O. forces in southern Lebanon, what is the case—again, in terms of necessity—for having extended the action? After the first phase of hostilities, the invasion no longer had a strictly preventive character, if it ever had. The Government in Jerusalem itself soon made this clear by announcing that its war goals were, apart from the establishment of a 25-mile-wide cordon sanitaire, the expulsion of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the reconstitution of an independent and democratic government in Beirut.

So much for necessity. But what of the other requirement of a just war—proportionality? In contrast to earlier wars Israel has fought, critics say, the war in Lebanon has been directed not only against combatants but also against civilians. Admittedly, the methods of warfare used by the P.L.O. have made observance of the distinction between combatant and noncombatant difficult and often impossible. But this prospect, it is argued, should have been taken more seriously in deciding whether or not to launch an attack and, particularly, in deciding whether or not to expand the war beyond the purpose of establishing a cordon sanitaire. In any event, to the question of whether the values preserved through force were proportionate to those values sacrificed by force, the general answer—implicit or explicit—has been negative.

Critics have thus held Israel to a very rigid standard—one that no government would seriously consider holding to in practice. In judging the issue of necessity, what they have done is not only to equate necessity with self-defense but also to interpret self-defense in a restricted manner. In this view, the claim of self-defense is legitimate only when force is used against an actual armed attack. Even then, the use of force is considered justified only so long as it is clearly restricted to protecting those interests immediately endangered. Force in excess of this purpose is apparently forbidden.

This is very close to the prevailing view of the just—and legal—war entertained today by jurists and moralists. It is also the prevailing view taken in the United Nations, exception being made, of course, for anticolonial wars. But it is not a view supported by the actual practice of states, and for the rather obvious reason that if followed, it would prove insufficient in preserving those interests on which the security of states rests.

There is no persuasive or even plausible reason why we should accept and apply a standard of behavior to Israel that finds no real support in state practice. The Israeli action was, quite clearly, an anticipatory measure, taken to forestall the prospect of serious injury. Certainly, the means to inflict such injury were present and increasing in southern Lebanon. That much, at least, is incontrovertible now that P.L.O. arms caches have been uncovered. To be sure, a plausible case can be made—and was made by the opposition in Israel—for containing the steady buildup of P.L.O. forces in southern Lebanon by deterrence rather than by overt confrontation. But this case raises practical issues of judgment over which reasonable men may differ, not moral issues.

In extending the war beyond the 25-mile zone, the Israelis went beyond the initially stated objective. Does the extension, and the war, thereby stand condemned? Even according to the prevailing standard, it has never been altogether clear whether acts of legitimate self-defense must be limited to repelling the immediate danger or may be directed toward removing the danger. A license to remove the danger obviously may be abused, yet an action limited to repelling a

danger may lose its purpose if circumstances permit the danger to reappear. Indeed, this is what happened after the 1978 Israeli incursion into Lebanon.

As for the issue of proportionality in war, it is seldom an easy one to address, let alone to resolve in a satisfactory way. In the scales of justice, how does one weigh the death and destruction of war against the purposes—however legitimate—for which war is undertaken? If weigh we nevertheless must attempt to do, as moral beings, experience should have at least taught us by now the hazards and uncertainties attending such efforts.

The war in Lebanon affords no exception to these strictures. The matter might be otherwise if the civilian casualties and destruction were of the magnitude that was first widely reported and accepted by an all-too-willingly credulous world. In fact, we now know that these inevitable consequences of war fought in populated areas are only a modest fraction of initial reports. That civilian casualties have been as small as they have is due largely to the efforts of discrimination made by the Israeli armed forces. In similar circumstances, these efforts compare favorably with any war fought by a Western power in the last half-century. Moreover, civilian casualties would have been far smaller still if the P.L.O. had not placed its military forces in the midst of civilian areas. Yet it is to the Israelis, not the P.L.O., that the critics have assigned heavy moral responsibility for the civilian bloodshed in Lebanon—just as it is the Israelis, not the P.L.O., who are charged with having waged brutal warfare.

Do these considerations resolve the issue of proportionality in a way favorable for Israel? They clearly would do so had Israel's survival been at stake in this war. Instead, what was immediately at stake was the security of northern Israel. Still, in these terms there is justification enough for the Israeli sweep of southern Lebanon. Beyond this, there is also a strong case for measures taken to remove the source of the threat not only to northern Israel but also to the security of the state generally, provided that these measures do not result in disproportionate death and destruction. Given the persistently avowed purposes of the P.L.O., and the activities undertaken in pursuit of those purposes, its destruction is a legitimate end in itself.

It is precisely over this broader aim of the war, however, that critics have been adamant in denying justification to the Israeli action. In condemning the war for this reason, critics assume that the P.L.O. is both the legitimate representative of the Palestinians (and of Palestinian nationalism) and the only possible representative. Even if that assumption were valid, it would not thereby deprive the Israeli action of justification. There is nothing in reason or mortality that enjoins a government to refrain from taking action against a threat to the state's security simply because that threat enjoys popular support. But if the assumption of critics were valid, it would point to a very bleak future. Although one cannot swear what will now happen with the P.L.O. in eclipse, one can swear what would not have happened had it remained in its prewar embodiment. So long as that P.L.O. persisted, the prospects for any serious movement toward a satisfactory resolution of the Palestinian issue was almost nonexistent. For as matters stood, the beneficiary of such a settlement would have been the P.L.O. The rejection of a P.L.O. state is a matter on which 95 percent of Israelis agree.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that if, despite the destruction of the P.L.O. as a military force, and perhaps as a political force as well, the Israeli Government uses its victory to harden further its policy in the occupied territories, the case made today by critics of the war will be made more persuasive.

A successor to the P.L.O. may eventually emerge from the war and even include some elements of the old P.L.O. But if it is reconstituted and if its self-image, means and goals are more realistic and modest, it may have a better chance of representing the Palestinian people with greater effectiveness than the P.L.O. ever did or could. That alone might one day come to justify the war in the eyes of many who now condemn it.

[From the New York Times, July 15, 1982]

ISRAELIS IN LEBANON: INDICATIONS OF UNEASE IN AMERICA—CRITICISM OF ISRAEL AMONG U.S. JEWS SEEMS TO BE RISING

(By Paul L. Montgomery)

Although the Israeli Government and the major Jewish organizations insist that virtually all American Jews support Israel's invasion of Lebanon, there is increasing evidence of disagreement as the attacks go on and the casualties mount.

As in Israel itself, opponents of the policies of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon are beginning to engage in skirmishes through articles, statements, letters and newspaper advertisements.

Beyond the main elements of organized American Jewish opinion—leaders of the scores of established groups, rabbis, intellectuals and writers—there are also indications of unease. Among the symptoms cited are agonized questioning of Israel's course, debates within families and among colleagues, as well as a search for justifications among the welter of opinions.

5.9 MILLION JEWS IN U.S.

The 5.9 million Jews in the United States constitute the largest Jewish population in the world—there are 3.1 million Jews in Israel—and there is no clear way of determining their feelings with precision. What is clear is that only a minority are actively involved in synagogues or other groups, and that even those involved do not necessarily agree with the leaders.

Supporters of Israel who were interviewed about their views said they believed that critics of Israel in the United States had become more vociferous, but not more numerous. Critics of Israel's course generally said they had opposed the Begin Government long before the invasion, but said they believed the uncommitted were being pushed toward dissent by events.

"Our powerful communal disposition has always been to support Israel and rally around the flag," said Leonard Fein, the editor of Moment, an independent Jewish intellectual journal. "The problem is that the flag now is in a suburb of Beirut, and that's a long way to go for a rally. Some people dropped off along the way—at the Litani River, to be exact."

A VERY TROUBLED CONSCIENCE

"It's a situation of a very troubled conscience," said Hans Jonas, a 79-year-old professor of philosophy at the New School for Social Research, who has been a Zionist since his youth in Germany. "The official Jewish organizations cannot bring themselves to say this, but in the rank and file I can assure you there is a feeling of disgust, of shame. I know rabbis who feel exactly as I do who cannot express it because their congregations would be up in arms."

Professor Jonas, who fought as an artillery lieutenant in Israel's 1948 war of independence, was among 67 American Jewish scholars, writers and rabbis who signed an advertisement this month in support of the Peace Now movement in Israel. The movement was founded in 1977 to oppose tendencies toward expansionism and reliance on arms.

The ad expressed "grave misgivings" over the fighting in Lebanon and advocated "national self-determination" for Palestinians. It also asked this question of American Jews:

"Is it not time for us as supporters of Israel to speak out critically about those Israeli policies we know to be mistaken, self-defeating, and contrary to the original Zionist vision?"

WAR TERMED ILL-ADVISED

Among the other signers were the writers Saul Bellow, E. L. Doctorow, Alfred Kazin and Irving Howe, and the scholars Meyer Schapiro, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset. Professors Glazer and Lipset, both leading sociologists, had previously written an article for the Op-Ed page of The New York Times terming the war "ill-advised" and calling on Israel to "recognize that Palestinian nationalism is as legitimate as Jewish nationalism."

The professors concluded with this analysis:

"The views we express here are widespread in Israel, as they are among American Jews. Unfortunately, although Israelis have spoken up in opposition to their Government's policies, American Jews have been largely silent, thereby possibly contributing to the Israeli Government's misperception that American Jews support it in this war."

Norman Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary magazine and perhaps the most unbending supporter of Israel among secular intellectuals, said he had seen no surprises among those who had written against Israeli policy in recent weeks or signed statements against it.

CRITICS CALLED A SMALL MINORITY

"Some people who associated Nat Glazer and Marty Lipset in a lump with me and Irving Kristol and the rest were surprised by them," he said, "but it was less of a change for them than people thought."

Mr. Podhoretz said most of the dissidents were people who had shown little concern for Israel in the past. "This is just a guess, but maybe 10 percent—even 15 percent—of American Jews have been unsympathetic or indifferent to Israel," he said. "Those people tend to surface on certain occasions. You're getting some who were converted to Israel in 1973, and are being deconverted now, but they were never very strong supporters in the first place."

The editor said he also objected to the style of dissent. "The way people congratulate themselves in dissenting is offensive to me," he said. "They say it takes courage, but if anything it takes courage to support Israel in certain circles. They're conforming in those circles, in my opinion."

Like many others interviewed, Mr. Podhoretz said he remained convinced of widespread approval of Israel's actions. "The overwhelming majority of American Jews still support Israel and are sympathetic to the present policies," he said. "I couldn't prove that, but I would be amazed if it wasn't true."

ISRAEL'S FIRST OPTIONAL WAR

Mr. Fein, whose Moment magazine has a circulation of 25,000, said discussion now had a far different quality than during Israel's previous wars. "There was practically no debate in 1967 or 1973," he said. "This is Israel's first optional war, and the first with large numbers of civilian casualties. This creates an emotional distance that permits—even encourages—debate."

The questioners are "not in a majority by any manner of means," Mr. Fein said, but he added that he thought the numbers were increasing. "There is a significant amount of people now who feel Israel's security interests would be best served by addressing the Palestinian issue directly and politically, not indirectly and militarily," he said.

I. F. Stone, a Washington writer who has been a persistent critic of Israel, said he felt dissent was "much more widespread than ever before." He said people who used to call him and Noam Chomsky "stooges of the P.L.O." were now joining him in petitions for peace.

"All kinds of spontaneous organizations are springing up, and not just with the usual peaceniks," he said. "There's a lot of disquiet in the leadership too, far more than is being voiced."

MOOD OF UNCERTAINTY SEEN

Many found a mood of uncertainty. "All of the exclamation points are being bent now into question marks," said Rabbi Balfour Brickner of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in Manhattan, who signed the Peace Now ad. "We're still small, I wouldn't even call it a groundswell, but it's got to make the Government of Israel nervous."

In the view of the mainline Jewish groups, however, expressions of dissent from some or all Israeli actions since June 6 are not representative of the whole.

"Don't get me wrong, nobody is celebrating, but I find American Jews really quite unified on this question," said Rabbi Joseph B. Glaser, executive vice president of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, a Reform body with a membership of 1,400. "Those sounding off most shrilly are the same old gang that has been criticizing Israel all the way down the line. The sound volume is up, but not the numbers."

"One thing that people involved in Jewish organizations know is that Jewish opinion is not a monolith," said Milton Ellerin, head of the trends analysis division of the American Jewish Committee. "There is the most consensus on Israel, but if Israel issues are taken away there is a wide variety of opinion on anything—politics, religion, you name it."

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

In the view of some, the opinions of unaffiliated Jews on Israel might be as closely related to those of Americans as a whole as to the statements of Jewish organizations. A poll frequently cited was taken by CBS News on June 26 and 27 among 985 voting-age Americans. It showed that twice as many people thought the

United States should give its "strongest support to Israel" as believed that it "should pay more attention to the demands of the Arabs."

However, of the 76 percent of the respondents who had heard of the fighting in Lebanon, 34 percent said Israel had been right to attack while 38 percent said Israel was wrong; 28 percent chose neither side.

While there have been floor debates and heated conferences over policy, leaders of the major organizations point out that no large American organization has come out against the Israeli action. Those groups that raise money for Israel say contributions are exceeding projections since the invasion of Lebanon.

Murray Wood, executive director of the Community Relations Committee of the Los Angeles Jewish Federation, said last week that he had on his desk a letter from a benefactor stopping contributions because of Israel's continuing presence in Lebanon but that such letters were "very few and far between."

P.L.O. SAID TO BENEFIT

"In general, people here tend to be very supportive of Israel's policy," Mr. Wood said. "I can't perceive we have the division that you read about on the East Coast. And the more that division is portrayed as being a reality, the more it will give the P.L.O. incentive to hold on. It's a dangerous situation."

Some see a psychological component in dissent. "There's an expression, 'self-hating Jew,'" said Rabbi Glaser of the Central Conference. "When Israel isn't a land of complete saints and angels, it's embarrassing to them—it's not how they want their Gentile friends to see them. They want to be like the other folks. I realize it's a harsh thing to say, and I'm not saying it's 100 percent or even 50 percent of what motivates them, but when the chips are down it comes through that way."

Rabbi Glaser, who served for four years as chairman of Religion in American Life, a leading interfaith group, said he also perceived anti-Semitism in the negative reaction of non-Jewish religious groups to the invasion.

VEHEMENCE OF CRITICISM NOTED

"I really am beginning to think this anti-Semitism business is endemic," he said. "The flashpoint has been the reaction on the Lebanon situation. I just can't explain it any other way, not the fact that there's opposition but the vehemence of it and their persistence in hanging on to statements that have been shown to be false."

Rabbi Brickner was asked what the reaction among friends and colleagues had been to his signing the Peace Now ad. "It's been better than worse," he said. "I'm more and more persuaded that the campaign has touched a nerve of pain in an ambivalent American Jewish community. I've heard from people who until now had remained silent and muttered to themselves in the quiet of their living rooms."

Rabbi Brickner said he rejected as "sheer and total nonsense" the argument that dissent gave comfort to Israel's enemies. "We are all unified on the continuation of Israel and their need for security," he said. "Everybody knows the P.L.O. has been completely humiliated. To say we are helping them is the kind of argument that's trying to make everybody march in lockstep. It's 'My country right or wrong,' but I've never adopted that for America and I'll be damned if I'll adopt it for Israel."

Senator TSONGAS. I think one of the tragedies of this event is that it has forced people of good will, with longstanding commitments to human rights, to justify what has happened in Beirut, and the contortions are painful. I heard someone the other day who has been very active in the peace movement in Massachusetts, very active in the whole issue of El Salvador, et cetera, say that the civilian deaths in Beirut and Lebanon are simply unavoidable in war.

It seems to me that the damage that Sharon and Begin have done is not only to Lebanon, but to the sense of innocence of Israel, which I think is lost. They have also damaged psychologically many Americans of goodwill, Jewish and non-Jewish, who are now forced to explain

away the unexplainable. And I think that punishment diminishes us all.

The estimation of 10,000 to 14,000 deaths in Lebanon exceeds that of El Salvador. And where are all the people who were concerned about human rights on that scale? Members of this committee, outspoken, pounding the table on human rights, and on this one so-so. That is all right, we understand politics. But do not expect to be credible next time.

It extends to both parties. Both of you represented or served Presidents that are very strong, except on this one.

The parallel on the domestic side, Mr. Chairman, is the social security issue. The Republicans are now running advertisements saying: Grandma and grandpa, you are going to get your cost-of-living increase. The Republicans are going to give it to you. The Democrats are out saying: Well, the only reason you are going to get it is because we refused to let them take it away from you.

And yet, whoever is unfortunate enough to be President 3 years from now is going to have to deal with that. And we all know it, and yet politics intrudes. At some point it is dismaying. I would be much more comfortable if it was just a Republican phenomenon, but it extends across the board. Reality will not go away and it is going to come back to haunt us.

I think this is an extremely sad situation, because it has hurt a lot of people, not only physically, but I think the contortions that have been gone through will be viewed back on very uncomfortably.

Now, I tell you, I have been outspoken on this issue not by choice; I just one day could take it no longer. If I am going to speak out on apartheid, if I am going to speak out on El Salvador, if I am going to speak out about Jews in Russia, how can I keep silent on this one? And I can tell you, it is no political plus.

But, I feel better. At any rate, I just wanted to get that out of my system.

The question is, Where do we go from here? The President met with Prime Minister Begin and it was like a tea party. Cluster bombs, a clear violation of the agreement with Dayan in April 1978. What did the President do? He did not mention it.

Senator Glenn raised the question of the use of defensive American weapons offensively, clearly a violation. What did the President do? He did not mention it.

The issue that Senator Percy raises, settlements. President Carter said they were illegal and an obstacle to peace. What is President Reagan saying? They are not illegal.

This is supposed to be a tough President?

There are two issues that come before us in the future, first, Beirut, and second, the settlements. Sharon has made it very clear that he wants to send 70,000 more people into the West Bank. I believe if Sharon had his way they would be into Beirut now.

The only constraining influence is the United States, and I would like to ask both of you whether you think the United States, for our sake and for Israel's sake, should really pressure the Begin government (A), not to go into Beirut, and (B), to cease the settlements, and whether not doing that hurts the interests of the United States and Israel over the long term? Because I believe that we are going to

create a generation of Palestinian terrorists. And there is nothing worse than people who have nothing to lose. You create a generation of those in the thousands, and nobody wins.

I did not mean to go on at such length, but you certainly get the gist of my feelings, I suspect. Would you like to comment?

Mr. BALL. Senator Tsongas, what you have just said is music to my ears because this is exactly the position that I have been urging. First, with respect to the settlements policy that the longer we let this go on and do nothing about it, the more irreversible the situation in the West Bank becomes to the point where the new facts that have been created will preclude any kind of rational solution to the problem.

I agree with you entirely also about the dangers of creating martyrs. Driving the PLO into some unknown destination is going to turn them from a solid base to a kind of irresponsible violence which I think may be greater than anything we have seen so far.

I have talked to Palestinians. I do not know any personally. I am as appalled by their terrorist tactics as I am by any terrorist tactics, but their plea is a simple one, it seems to me. "We are a dispossessed people, we have been forced into a diaspora, we have been denied our homeland. Nobody listens to us, nobody talks to us. We try to make our point rationally and it falls on deaf ears. Violence is the only way we have of calling attention to our cause. What else can we do?"

That is the problem. I think there should be a dialog started. I think the idea that the PLO must come forward and give up its only bargaining counter as it sees it—perhaps wrongly, but it still sees it—which is the provision in its protocol with regard to the destruction of Israel is a commitment that should be expected not as a prelude to negotiations but as a result of negotiations. This is what happens at the end. I do not see it as a condition precedent, since Israel has offered nothing. Mr. Begin is saying Judea and Samaria, the West Bank, they are ours anyway; we are not going to make any concessions there, and he has reduced the whole autonomy proposals to apartheid. That is what his present proposals amount to if you examine them carefully. They are nothing at all. They are an offer to make the West Bank a Soweto for Israel.

I think that you are quite right. We can expect a great deal of violence because there is no other outlet for the passions that the Palestinians have built up over 40 years, and there are now millions of them. New generations are coming along who have known nothing but the struggle, and they will be even more fierce and even more irrational.

So I feel very pessimistic because, as I indicated at the end of my statement, I really do not think we are going to do anything sensible or serious. We may talk a little bit, but when a new situation develops, we will do nothing.

I agree with you about the Sharon plan. There is much more to it than that, as you well know. It has not been publicized but it has been widely circulated, suggesting that Sharon's ultimate hope is the destabilization of Jordan and the extension of Israeli influence through a very much larger area. That is Sharon's view, I am not saying that it is now Israeli policy, but it is a portent for the future. The one most heartening thing is the expression of discontent and opposition that is arising in Israel itself because you are quite right. Israel is losing

96-794 O - 82 - 4

its innocence. It has lost its innocence, but there are many people who still hold to the noble concept of Israel, and they are rapidly being pushed aside, largely because we make it possible. To the extent that we acquiesce in everything that Mr. Begin does, we forgive him all of his transgressions, we run interference for him in the rest of the world. We are building up all the wrong people. We are building up an Israel which we are not going to like very much and which is going to be a menace to the peace at the end of the road. That is not the Israel that the idealistic Zionists had in mind, which was a noble concept.

Israel has ceased to be that. It is rapidly becoming a warrior state. Israel is no longer Athens; it is becoming Sparta, and that should gravely concern all of us.

Mr. ALLEN. Senator, I will not get into all of the elements of disagreement between Mr. Ball and me.

I would like to respond to your question, which had two parts. In the first instance you asked about Beirut and whether the United States should exert pressure on the Israelis not to move into West Beirut. I believe we should try to persuade Israel to desist from unnecessary and, certainly wanton bloodshed under any and all circumstances. I do believe, however, that it is absolutely imperative the PLO be removed from West Beirut and removed from Lebanon. So I do not believe that we should pull all of the stops at the present time because I think that the deterrent effect of Israeli forces is very valuable in the ultimate objective of seeking the removal of the PLO and ultimately the Syrians as well.

Senator TSONGAS. By force if necessary?

Mr. ALLEN. I trust not by force. I indicated that such force would obviously involve bloodshed, but I believe that we should study very carefully the implications of any actions that we would take designed to persuade or pressure the Israelis to remove themselves from the seige of Beirut at the present time.

Senator TSONGAS. What if it comes to that choice?

Mr. ALLEN. Then I think we would have to reflect very carefully about our own objectives in the region. We would have to take into account the likely and lamentable toll. I think we all share a concern about bloodshed, particularly among civilians. But let us not forget that it has been estimated that up to 100,000 Lebanese have been either injured or killed over a period of years by virtue of the PLO and Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Lebanon had ceased to become an effective state. And it is this action now taking place, although it involves considerable bloodshed and casualty, all of which is lamentable, that may set the stage for a free and independent Lebanon which I consider to be an absolutely essential objective for American Middle East policy.

Mr. BALL. May I say just a word in comment?

Senator TSONGAS. I think I am already out of time.

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I do have a couple of additional points.

No one wants the PLO, but there is no reason whatsoever to permit the PLO to stay in Lebanon or in Beirut. It is perfectly obvious that the patrons of the PLO, Syria, and presumably the Soviet Union—since the PLO found itself in such rich possession of Soviet weaponry—that nobody wants them at the present, nobody wants the troops.

The issue of the Palestinian refugees is quite separate, and I think it can be handled. The issue of the moment is the disposition of the PLO military forces. Once the PLO is removed from Lebanon and from Beirut particularly, and once the Syrians are out, the chances for a free and independent Lebanon, which is the cornerstone of everything, as I see it, in the Middle East, will be increased substantially.

With regard to the settlements, I believe that a cessation of the expansion of the settlements at the present time until some meaningful or measurable progress is made would be a good idea.

I do not share the view that President Reagan is not tough on this issue, Senator. During the 1980 campaign President Reagan laid down several conditions that would have to be fulfilled before the United States could discuss or negotiate in any way directly with the PLO. One is that the PLO cease practicing and advocating terrorism; and two, that the PLO recognize the existence of Israel and recognize Israel's right to exist within secure and recognizable borders.

Now, those conditions, if fulfilled, will make an important contribution to achieving peace in the Middle East. Nothing said here will change the reality that these conditions must, in fact, be met before the United States will engage in any direct dialog with the PLO.

Senator TSONGAS. I thank the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

George, the trouble with your paper is that you pussyfoot. [General laughter.]

Let me start with the last thing you said, that our abdication of responsibility is a road toward disaster, not only for the United States, but for Israel.

Can you expand a little on why you think this is a potential disaster for Israel?

Let me say it is a view that I share with you, and I think that it really needs some broad exposition so that the American people and those of us who consider ourselves good friends of Israel can really understand the kind of troubles that are in the making.

Mr. BALL. As Israel has become a warrior state with expansionist ambitions—at least so far as the Begin government and leading critical figures such as General Sharon are concerned—it has lost its soul, it has lost its spirit.

What is happening is a change in the demography of the country; the Oriental Jews, the Jews from the mellahs of Morocco, from the Maghreb, from Yemen, are becoming a majority of the population. Eighty percent of the Jews coming from the Soviet Union will not go to Israel, even though that is their stated excuse for coming out. The emigration of even the Sabras, the Jews who were born in Israel, is becoming alarming.

Israel is not a state that is attractive to live in anymore. It has an inflation rate of 150 percent or some such order of magnitude. It exists economically by virtue of a very large subsidy from the United States which has been increasing toward something like $1,000 a person for every man, woman and child in the country. Israel is no longer viable. It is losing its viability as a state. It is becoming——

Senator MATHIAS. That economic assistance, which is a relatively new aspect of the relationship, has become absolutely vital. In fact, I remember a few years ago when Senator Inouye and I went to Israel to discuss the economic aid with the then Finance Minister, Mr. Rabinowitz, who was asking for some increase in economic aid, I said, well, suppose we are unable to do as you ask? What will be the result? And I remember he literally ate his necktie before he answered, his tension and his intensity was so great. And he said, if you do not give it to us, we cannot survive.

Mr. BALL. What I am suggesting, Senator, is that a state that has become preoccupied with military matters coupled with an expanionist ambition discourages the young. They cannot spend their time in military service all the time and still run their businesses or build their future. So they are getting out.

Can Israel count on U.S. aid going on forever at anything like this order of magnitude? It is a very big drain. Such aid is the one sacrosanct item in the budget, even more so than tobacco subsidies.

Senator MATHIAS. At the same time that it is creating some difficulties and embarrassments for us and conflicts in our own interests.

Mr. BALL. Exactly. Israel has become one of the world's great arms merchants. I think it is probably about the third or fourth in the world after the Soviet Union, ourselves, and France. Israel's arms are going in places that are not very attractive from our point of view, to South Africa, to Argentina at the time of the fight——

Senator MATHIAS. Iran.

Mr. BALL [continuing]. To Iran.

Again, I think that what we are witnessing is something very tragic. It is the lost of a dream, the loss of an ideal, the transformation of a state which once offered great hope and inspiration to the world, but has now become so obsessed with its own ambitions and its own preoccupation with military matters that it is piling up so many enemies in the world that if it did not have the United States, it would be in great trouble. As it is, Israel is more feared by its neighbors than it fears its neighbors because of the fantastic degree of its military buildup. It has more tanks than England, France, the Benelux countries, and Italy—put together—a country of 3 million people.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, your comment about the loss of the dream recalls an article that was written recently, published in the Washington Post by our mutual friend, Al Friendly.

And Mr. Chairman, it would seem to me appropriate to include that article at this point in the record, and I would so request.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be incorporated.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post, June 29, 1982]

ISRAEL: RECOLLECTIONS AND REGRETS

(By Alfred Friendly)

It was the Thursday of the war—everyone then in Israel links remembered events of the Six Day War to the days of the week—and by then the atmosphere was relaxed. The war had long since been won; to be exact, by 9 a.m. Monday, the first day, when the Egyptian air force was destroyed. By Wednesday, East Jerusalem was securely in Israeli hands and there remained only tending to the Syrian killers-for-the-fun-of-it on the Golan Heights.

The afternoon was hot and sunny; six or eight top-level civil servants in the Foreign Office, in the echelons just below that of the foreign minister, were lolling on the crab grass surrounding the drab rectangular boxes that constituted the department's Jerusalem headquarters. I had interviewed most of them in the preceding weeks and made free to join their coffee break.

"There won't be any trouble in getting the Sinai back to Nasser quickly," one of the men said. "We've already got all the sand we need in the Negev. The border needs extending only a few hundred yards at the west end of the Gaza Strip to use the terrain for better defenses. No problem for us or the Egyptians.

"But getting the West Bank back to Hussein may be harder. It'll take a bit of diplomatic footwork, but there's nothing in the problem that's intractable."

"You don't want *any* of the West Bank?" I asked.

"East Jerusalem, of course," someone replied. "The city must never be divided again. But beyond that, and decontaminating the Golan of our Syrian cousins, nothing is needed but some minor border changes, like eliminating the Latroun Salient [a murder trap for the Israelis in the 1948 war] because just as we have all the sand we want, so have we already enough Arabs too."

The renunciation of territorial aggrandizement was entirely credible; if any doubts remained about the government's attitude they were wiped out by Israel's enthusiastic acceptance of United Nations Resolution 242 a short while later. It forbade the acquisition of any land gained by military conquest but allowed, by implication, small border rectifications.

There were good reasons for the attitude expressed that afternoon by my Foreign Office friends. The most compelling was the nation's surplusage of Arabs. In those days, 15 years ago, the Israelis I knew seemed to have a conscience. What gnawed at it most grievously, what most embarrassed and pained decent citizens in their private self-appraisals, was the realization that they were denying full justice and full citizenship and civil rights to a people in their midst, a people who did not consent to their governance and who were being dominated by force. Less important, but a factor, was the rate of Arab proliferation, significantly higher than the Jewish.

Second, Jews were not about to set at naught their furious denials of the accusations, standard throughout the Arab world, that the Zionist objective was that of the Bible, a realm extending from the Nile to the Euphrates. My Israeli friends, bitter at a charge they could not allay, argued that they had been willing to accept an even smaller territory in 1948 than their present state, had not the Arabs gone to war over the U.N. partition of Palestine. Only the crazies, said my friends, the wildly orthodox waiting around for the Messiah, talked of *Eretz Israel*—the "land of Israel" in Old Testament terms. Two or 3 percent of the population, maybe.

Finally, those men sprawled out on the grass wanted above all else peace, and they were realists. Peace on that narrow strip of the Levant was not to be had by occupation of 20 more miles of land to the east, but only by accord with their neighbors.

My friends, those in the Foreign Office nominally nonpartisan, and others throughout the country, were mainly adherent of the Labor Party. My mistake was to assume they were the totality; I was unaware of the Begins and Sharons.

But in those days, Israel seemed to me one of the few nations in the world with a conscience that was national, not merely individual, and a nation that cherished values beyond the mere material and consisting of achievements of the intellect and the spirit. It was "a community that honors a moral purpose," I wrote at the time. More than most Christians, I thought, the Israeli Jews cherished the Beatitude that blessed those who hungered and thirsted for righteousness.

Even in their agony over the horror of the Holocaust, their rage at injustices heaped on them by history and their continued rejection, their arguments were made with words of reason, not by mouth-foaming. Their standards—which I took to be *national* standards—exalted decency, truth-telling, compassion, tolerance and honor and made me proud of an inheritance I shared with them.

On a return visit a few months after the war, I saw the first Nahal settlements on the West Bank. "Paramilitary, only temporary, for short-term defense until peace terms are agreed on," said my Israeli journalist companion with whom I had covered the war in double-harness. He was embarrassed and spoke without conviction.

"Temporary, my eye!" I said. "Those young couples, with their shovels as well as their guns, are married, or should be, and are making new homes and breaking

ground for new farms, which they aren't going to abandon. Those settlements seem to me to be permanent acquisitions and break your promises about not grabbing your neighbors' land. Each new settlement will make final agreement on peace that much harder, if not impossible."

My colleague kept his silence, gloomily.

Soon came the Dayan Plan, proposing garrison-settlements along the mountain ridges west of the Jordan River, then the Allon Plan, for the same things on the river itself. Finally came the Likud government and the triumph of the *Eretz Israel* boys: Begin raising the ante every week on the number of permanent West Bank settlements to be established; the ultimate promise that not one inch of that territory, the biblical Judea and Samaria, would ever be given up; full capitulation to the religious extremists; abandonment, in the end without even shame or embarrassment, of the pledges in Resolution 242.

Perhaps it was expecting more than was possible—that Israel should remain the country with a conscience, a home for honor, a treasury for the values of mind and soul. At any rate, it is so no longer but merely a nation like any other, its unique splendor lost. Begin, riding roughshod over the interests of the country that keeps Israel alive, complains when America expresses dismay that we are treating it as a "banana republic." But what is it when its credibility, its promises and its slaughters are on a par with those of a country—to pick one or two out of the air, the fetid air—of Trujillo's Dominican Republic or Papa Doc's Haiti? Still absent are the jackboots, the shoulder boards and the bemedalled chests, but one can see them, figuratively, on the minister of defense.

No doubt Israel is still an interesting country. But not for the reasons, the happy reasons, that made it such for me.

Senator MATHIAS Mr. Allen, do you have any comment on the dangers to Israel that are inherent in this situation?

Mr. ALLEN. Senator Mathias, I just heard Mr. Ball's litany, which included these elements: Israel is a warrior state with expanionist aims, has lost its soul, its spirit. It is not a state attractive to live in. It has lost its dream. It is no longer viable.

I don't think I have heard an accurate description of a country which I have visited and with which I have dealt. I wonder if that litany reflects a majority view not only of the inhabitants of Israel but of its many, many supporters here in this country, and I speak not only of Americans of Jewish descent, but of Americans in general. I do not think so.

We have not heard any mention of the Palestinian National Charter, which commits the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and presumably all of its proponents throughout the world, to the physical destruction of Israel.

I hasten to add that I do see dangers to Israel emerging from the present circumstances, and the way in which we achieve a settlement of the affairs of Lebanon today, or the way in which we assist others to come to a settlement, will determine whether or not those dangers will prevail in the long run for Israel. There is a clear danger that Israel-American relations may deteriorate. I understand there was a stormy session between this committee and the Prime Minister of Israel, and I would not have characterized what I read as summaries of an entirely friendly meeting.

Yes, I think there is a risk to Israel, judicious Israelis must assess that risk. Without the United States, Israel would be placed immediately in mortal danger. But we have a solemn commitment to Israel, and because Israel may have behaved in a way that is not suitable to some of us, or perhaps has taken actions that might have affected our vital interests in the region, does not mean that we should threaten to use the stick on Israel or that we are going to cancel that relationship.

Senator MATHIAS. May I interrupt you before we get away from this—you say we have a commitment, and I agree with that. We have a commitment to Israel. We helped to bring Israel into existence, and we have nurtured her for nearly 40 years now. But is that commitment totally open ended, to support any policy that any Prime Minister of Israel may choose to pursue at any moment in history, or is that commitment to do those things which are consistent with the interests of the United States and which permit the survival of Israel?

Mr. ALLEN. It is certainly not an open ended commitment to back any action which a Prime Minister of Israel may now take or may take in the future.

Senator MATHIAS. I think that is an important distinction to make, and I think that may be the distinction which is lost—and I say that in light of the conversation we had in this very room with Prime Minister Begin—that the commitment is certainly there, and I am certainly one of the first to uphold it. But I think it at least implies a reciprocal respect by Israel for the interests of the United States.

Mr. ALLEN. I agree, Senator, but I also believe that we should concentrate on the fundamentals in front of us. The new situation that can be created by liberating Lebanon from the pernicious forces of occupation can be a significant step. I believe that it makes no sense whatsoever to leave in place those structures that caused the decay and the collapse of Lebanon as a viable state.

I have no doubt that Israel will withdraw its troops at an appropriate moment, as soon as it has assurance that the PLO and the Syrians have left Lebanon. That is our objective, too. That is an objective that serves peace.

Senator MATHIAS. I have before me the Baltimore Sun, an excellent newspaper which I urge you to read.

Mr. ALLEN. I will be happy to read it, Senator, if you will pass it over.

Senator MATHIAS. On the front page there is an article by Jeff Price which says that Israeli officials yesterday accused the Palestinians of dragging the negotiations to get them out of West Beirut, back to square one, and warned, "No one should be surprised if and when we enter West Beirut."

I wonder what each of you would do if you were back in your previous official incarnations and read that quotation.

Mr. BALL. Well, I can give you an answer myself. I will tell you the position I would take. I could not guarantee that the President at the time would have adopted it, but I think we would promptly serve notice on the Israelis that attacking West Beirut is simply not on, that Israel cannot use our weapons for the kind of attack that would have to be made on West Beirut—an attack that would be accompanied by the slaughter of civilians. There is no way to avoid such slaughter. An army cannot move into a city and ferret out a few people. We should clearly state that this would be so obnoxious to all of our principles and such a flagrant violation of the conditions under which the weapons were given that there would have to be a very long term suspension of all weapon transfers.

I do not understand why we do not do this. I must say I have read with increasing annoyance the statements that have been coming out of the Israeli Government telling us that we had better get our nego-

tiator to do something or Israel is going in and use our weapons to slaughter a lot of innocents. This I resent as an American.

Mr. ALLEN. The first thing I would do is to verify the source, since I would want to know about the authenticity of the spokesman and whether or not that represents declared policy.

Senator MATHIAS. Let me give you the source. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, interviewed on Israeli television last night, warned that while Israel has not set a specific deadline for concluding the negotiations, "time is not unlimited."

Mr. ALLEN. Once assured that it was in fact——

[General laughter.]

Mr. ALLEN [continuing]. Foreign Minister Shamir, I believe that we would——

Senator MATHIAS. Again I say the Baltimore Sun is a great paper. You can rely on it. [General laughter.]

Mr. ALLEN. It is without question a superior paper.

I think that we would want to assure that no action of a military nature involving the indiscriminate loss of life take place. That would require persuasion, and perhaps pressure on Israel.

Incidentally, I do not believe, in that connection, that whatever remains for Israel to do militarily requires the use of American weapons. What would we do in that circumstance?

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, my time has long since expired, and I apologize to Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. No problem.

Senator MATHIAS. I hope he will ask the question which I did not get time to ask, which is, is it of any use to have this phrase left in the law that these weapons only be used for defensive purposes? [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. A new technique has been developed for extending Senators' time. [General laughter.]

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. The best way to prevent problems is to have some agreement in advance.

Mr. Allen, you talked about the firm policy or the tough policy of the President toward the Mideast. There are two major problems we have seen that have vexed the Jewish and the non-Jewish communities in this country, anybody that has followed the whole Israeli situation. That is the West Bank policy, No. 1, and offensive-defensive use of equipment.

The President of the United States has refused, during two visits of Mr. Begin to this country, to even discuss those issues with him? Why?

Mr. ALLEN. Of course, I am not here to respond for the President, and I am not aware of what occurred in the most recent visit, but the issue was, in fact, addressed in the previous visit of Prime Minister Begin.

Senator GLENN. Not true.

Mr. ALLEN. Well, sir, Secretary Haig made a trip to——

Senator GLENN. No. I am talking about between the President and the Prime Minister.

Mr. ALLEN. I see. That is true. The issue did not come up in great detail. I cannot answer why. Perhaps the agenda of items was so broad

at the time of Prime Minister Begin's state visit to the United States that time did not permit. It was also believed that the issue had been adequately treated at the ministerial level between Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Shamir.

Senator GLENN. Well, when these are the two biggest stumbling blocks we have had between us, it is just incomprehensible to me that our heads of state would meet and not discuss those items.

I recall very well a meeting when you were still in the White House, and I am sure the chairman recalls very well when he turned to me and asked me to recount what had happened when Begin came to this committee. I recounted how Prime Minister Begin told us that he was very pleasantly surprised that the President did not bring up the subject of West Bank settlements nor a definition of offensive-defensive use of equipment. He smiled and said he was prepared to discuss it.

Mr. ALLEN. Some liberty was taken with the understandings that had been reached, Senator Glenn, and I think I conveyed that to you at the time.

Senator GLENN. You did, and I did not agree with you at that time, and everyone tried to make excuses for the President in the Cabinet room at the White House that day. First, the Vice President said, well, we discussed this, and I said yes, but did the President and the Prime Minister discuss it? Then you said, we discussed this at the national security level, and I once again asked you, but did the President and the Prime Minister discuss it? And the Secretary of Defense, down by the entrance into the President's office said that we had complete discussions on this at the Defense Department, and I said for the third time, did the President and the Prime Minister discuss it? The room was silent.

Mr. ALLEN. I recall the meeting in exquisite detail, Senator.

Senator GLENN. I do, too, very well.

And on the last visit, in this very room, at the luncheon to which you referred, I asked Prime Minister Begin again, did he and the President discuss these matters, and he just smiled and said, no, they did not come up again, Senator.

As long as we refuse to take matters that are most at issue and discuss between heads of state these misunderstandings, and the actions that Mr. Ball refers to, I just do not see that they are going to really be controlled or that understandings will be had, or that our law will be understood in Israel as well as here in the way in which the law was intended. I just think these things have to be taken up at the very highest level.

I am not sure I understand exactly your attitude on sending the Marines into Beirut.

Do you favor sending them in now or not?

Mr. ALLEN. Although I did not address that subject, I would not oppose sending our Marines. But I would prefer to see the troops of other nations perform that service.

Senator GLENN. Well, what function——

Mr. ALLEN. However, if the President finds that the essential condition is fulfilled, that the Government of Lebanon has requested such troops, then I believe that the presence of such troops is warranted.

I am concerned about an ultimate loss of American life, not necessarily in combat, but perhaps through sniper activity.

Senator GLENN. That is combat to me.

Mr. ALLEN. What I meant to say was, not there for the purpose of combat but for people to be murdered by snipers.

Now, that would lead to a rapid public reconsideration of the wisdom of having put the troops in in the first place.

Senator GLENN. I presume if they go in they are a force. If this is so well arranged that it is to be peaceful entry of the Marines, if that is guaranteed then the Marines are not needed. If it is not guaranteed, then we are sending in a force that may have to use force.

Would you authorize the Marines to shoot Israeli troops if a combat situation arose there?

Mr. ALLEN. I should not imagine that a circumstance like that would arise.

Senator GLENN. Well, now, if they are going in as a force to keep the peace, and a fire fight develops, and all sides do not stop immediately, and they are there to enforce the peace, it is not just the PLO they might wind up shooting at. Would you approve that?

Mr. ALLEN. Senator, I could not conceive of such a circumstance, and I would then——

Senator GLENN. Well, I sure could. How can you conceive that there will not be a fire fight develop there if they go in?

Mr. ALLEN. If such a circumstance should develop, then I think our Marines would have to take actions to defend themselves, but I want to stress that it seems to me to be an unreasonable if not improbable situation.

Senator GLENN. The point I am making is that if they are there to enforce the peace, and someone shoots at the Marines there, they are going to retaliate, wherever those shots came from or whether they might even be Soviet agents in there to try and instigate problems.

Mr. ALLEN. As properly they should, under the circumstances, retaliate against any fire.

Senator GLENN. Well, I have been very concerned, too, that the administration in a second area has not really dealt with something I think is very important. I brought it up during Secretary Shultz' confirmation hearing a couple of days ago. In all our discussions with the State Department, with everybody we have talked to from there over the past couple of weeks about this, there is no real tying of the long-term settlement to what we say or may not do. It seems to me we have more leverage right now in that area than we will ever have in the future. The Arabs want us to come in to get this quieted down. They are really more concerned about Iran and what is going on there than they are about Israel right at the moment, and with good reason. But they want to get that area settled down.

Can we use this as leverage to get them to recognize Israel's right to exist in secure borders?

Lebanon wants us to come in. Would Lebanon be willing to sign the Camp David accords?

The PLO wants us to come in. Are they willing to say now that if we bail them out of the pickle they are in, they will cease and desist from terrorism, for instance?

Israel wants us in. Are they willing to put the West Bank back in as part of the autonomy talks?

It just seems to me we have a confluence, a coming together of more interests that we can influence now for the long term to insure that we do not repeat this tragic pattern 4 or 5 years down the road, but we are not using this. We are just talking about sending the troops in to save the people in West Beirut, and that is it.

Mr. ALLEN. I think that your recitation describes accurately the true potential that our diplomacy now addresses.

Senator GLENN. We are not tying it together, though, Dick.

Mr. ALLEN. Well, let us give it time.

Senator GLENN. Nobody in the State Department, or from the White House—I have asked these same specific questions and they said, well, we have to get the fighting stopped. That is what we have heard time after time after time over week after week.

Mr. ALLEN. I could not agree more emphatically with you: the time is now. I said as much in my prepared remarks.

What is extremely important is the position of the Soviet Union. The Lebanon issue is inextricably linked with the overall issue of East-West relations, and the lessons that we seem to have learned as a consequence of the military successes of Israel and the defeat of those who were supported by the Soviet Union are very important lessons.

So, if you are saying we should strike while the iron is hot, I express my full agreement with you and underscore the necessity for a comprehensive policy statement. Some policy statement now is urgently required, even though it may have to be revised as time progresses, according to the circumstances, but a comprehensive policy statement, a set of objectives needs to be enunciated, and this committee has not only a responsibility but an opportunity on its own part to influence the expression of that policy.

Senator GLENN. I sincerely hope that the expressions of hope for a bipartisan foreign policy expressed by Mr. Shultz are going to be carried out. I really think that is crucial for this country, whatever administration is in the White House or whoever may be Secretary of State. I think we have seen too many changes in our foreign policy. Some occurred while you were there, some since you left the office at the White House, but we have had so many flipflops and it has left our allies concerned.

You said you just came back from a world tour. I would be very surprised if many of the heads of state or prime ministers or foreign ministers, whoever you talked to, were not extremely concerned about our flipflops on pipelines and grain deals and just a whole litany of things that I went into the other day with Secretary Shultz. I will not repeat them here because my time is almost up, but it has left not only our own people confused, but every country around the world confused.

And I think we truly do need a bipartisan foreign policy.

But I want to come back to where I started this. If the President of the United States is not willing to sit down with the Prime Minister of Israel and define where we are going with the West Bank, which is the key to autonomy talks, and where we are going in defining offensive-defensive use of equipment, then we are not making much progress.

Mr. Ball, you got left out of this.

Do you want to make any comment on any of these things?

Mr. BALL. It is just possible, Senator, that I have talked too much already.

Senator GLENN. No.

Mr. BALL. That is not the first time.

I would like to make just one observation. Running through the discussion this morning there has been a kind of inarticulate assumption that the problem with Lebanon is simply that there are foreign forces there and if the foreign forces were withdrawn, we would have a very tractable and pacific country. The fact is that Lebanon came apart in 1958. Later in the seventies disorders again occurred and the Syrians went in to try to stabilize the situation with our tacit approval. Lebanese instability did not occur because the Syrians and the PLO came in. It occurred because there is a terribly difficult religious and ethnic mix in the country, with the Druze and the Shia Muslims and the Sunni Muslims and the Maronite Christians and the Greek Orthodox Christians. Lebanon is ruled by a number of local warlords. It is not a country; really, it is a kind of conglomerate. And the largest single element in the population is the Shia Muslim population.

The Israelis are talking with the Christian Phalange leader, General Gemayel who is Fascist in background, and hoping that somehow a deal can be made with him that would result in a heavily Israeli-influenced Lebanese Government which would act more or less as an agent for them. This is the way I read it.

I do not think this is the key to stability at all. I think we have to look much more deeply into the Lebanese situation than we have and not make these assumptions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no questions. I think the subjects that I would have asked, have been well covered.

I would like to defer to the Senator from Connecticut who was in Lebanon more recently than I was and I think—and I would like to say it publicly—displayed great personal bravery in going to West Beirut. A few weeks before, I know that I found it very disturbing to see the conditions we had then, where when you drove a car, the people had to lean out with machine guns ready and pointed, and you were there under even more inauspicious circumstances than I was. So I congratulate you on going.

The CHAIRMAN. Followed on the heels of a trip to El Salvador, too, at a particularly perilous time.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. It is the beaches, Mr. Chairman. [General laughter.]

And I thank the Senator from Rhode Island for his comment, but let the record reflect that I am an unqualified chicken. I was not in any way looking for trouble.

I appreciate both of you being here this morning. I apologize for coming in a few minutes late and missing your opening statements. As Senator Pell pointed out, Senator Levin of Michigan and I were in Lebanon for 2½ days, and in Israel as well.

Let me just share some of my observations, and I believe they are shared by Senator Levin as well, and then ask for both of you to comment on them.

First of all, I should say, Mr. Chairman, at the outset, there are a couple of points that strike me as deeply disturbing. One is the rhetoric. I do not recall the level of bitterness and the level of hate that I have heard pour out in this country in the last 3 or 4 weeks. We have lost perspective, it seems to me. And Mr. Ball, I have a great deal of respect for you. We have met a number of times. I think your contribution to this country has been exemplary of what a good diplomat can be, but even the rhetoric that you used this morning I find strident at a time when it seems to me cool heads are needed.

We are talking about a very good ally over the years, an ally that I think made some mistakes in the last few weeks, but still a strong ally, an ally who has demonstrated it wants peace in the Middle East. They made it with an enemy that they had fought with on four or five different occasions, in the Camp David peace process, a peace that is lasting. That ought not to be forgotten in this context.

We talk about events since June 6. Israel is a nation that has gone through five wars, that has demonstrated a commitment to human values. I find some of the same rhetoric being leveled against the State of Israel that we hear leveled against ourselves from time to time when there are administrations or people within administrations who do things that run contrary to our traditional values, and yet I find myself sensing that some degree of anger that I wish people understood that in a democracy where various people at various times assume positions of power, they will do things that will annoy and antagonize, but that is no reason to indict a nation or a people, particularly one as courageous and as committed as the people of Israel are for peace in their own region. No one wants peace more than they do.

And so I would hope in the coming weeks as we try to resolve this problem with the new issue now imposed upon us by the Iran-Iraq war, that we will try to take the long view. There is a new dimension in the Middle East, a new reality, that we have to take cognizance of. Hopefully from that, a new momentum can be developed which will achieve the kind of peace and stability that I believe people of good will in the Middle East desire. And my concern and fear is that the events have raised, as I say, the level of rhetoric and are contributing to more of a division in the area rather than contributing to trying to bring those elements together, and that worries me.

I did one of these talk back shows last night, and I could not believe the comments that were coming in, Begin and Hitler, Naziism in Israel. Good God, where is that coming from? Having someone get up who said that they think Israel is absolutely correct, and there is a significant difference between a Palestinian child and an Israeli child; they are not equal. What illogic is that? And yet I happen to believe that people in this country and elsewhere are fed that kind of thinking. They just do not think it up on their own.

And people who are in positions of responsibility, people who are listened to I think have a responsibility to try and cool tempers and remind people of the historical context in which we talk, where things could go. And that is not to excuse mistakes or violations of law or things that are wrong either.

But I am concerned that we are engendering more divisions and more hate and more bitterness than we are trying to contribute to a peaceful process.

Let me just share a couple of observations and then ask you both to comment.

The one thing that struck me—and Senator Levin and I met with both Moslems and Christians in Lebanon, had long talks with former Prime Minister Salam, Mr. Berri, who is the head of the Shiites, Mr. Butros, the Foreign Minister, the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, met with Bashir Jemayil, met with mayors in Sidon and Tyre, members of the Maronite clergy, packed in 2½ or 3 days, and Lord knows, as one swallow does not make a summer, 2½ days does not make an expert, but here were some things that came out of those conversations. I tried to find some common denominators that emerged. And there were a couple that came forward.

One is such a strong desire, and expressed strongly in a number of different ways, for Lebanon to have its country back and for all the foreign elements to go. The formal statement by the Lebanese Government had not been issued at the time we were there. And in all this discussion since June 6 we have talked about our interests, we have talked about the Israeli interests, we have talked about the Palestinian interests, we have talked about the Arab interests, the European interests, and I rarely have heard anyone really talk about the Lebanese interests. They are the victims in all of this. It is their country that is the target of the aggression from wherever it comes. They are the ones who have virtually been without a government for 7 years. They are the ones who desperately want to put their country back together again. And they find it extremely hard to do when they are occupied by other people. And that is how they see it.

So that was one point. They wanted that sense of everyone leaving them alone and working at rebuilding a nation.

And I asked them how they expected to do that. You have 13 Christian factions, at least four Moslem factions that have been divided over the last 7 or 8 years. And their response to me was, "we have done it before. We did it before. We had a democracy before in our country. It was difficult." We had to reach agreements with each other, things that we would find bizarre, I suppose, at the very least, where we attribute certain public positions to certain religious groups, but the fact of the matter is that Lebanon was the jewel, Lebanon was the exception in the Middle East for years. It was virtually a democracy, a thriving economy, a people who had peace in their land. Beirut was considered the Paris of the Middle East.

So when people suggest to them that they cannot do it, they retort, "we have done it. We did it when no one else could. Why do you not give us the chance again to try and do it, to put those factions together. We have proven in the past that Christian and Moslem can live together in peace in our country, and we would like to be given the opportunity to try it again, and we cannot as long as we are being occupied by others." So that was a common thread and denominator that came through.

I did not get into West Beirut because of the fighting, frankly, and I regret that we did not have a chance to talk to people there. So that gap exists in my limited trip to the country.

But it was expressed in different ways, and I was surprised by the comments. Let me just share some of them with you. In Tyre and Sidon, talking with the mayor there, talking with the Maronites, talking with business people, shopkeepers along the street, they thought the Israeli bombing was excessive in Tyre. They wished that somehow they had talked with them ahead of time or could have communicated with them somehow to determine the quantity of PLO that were there. But that aside—and they expressed that universally—the general feeling was that the Israeli army had provided them with some relief, that they virtually were not in control of their town. The mayor said, "I did not run my town for 7 years. It was being run by the PLO. The clergy, the Maronites, say they could not leave their homes after 4 o'clock. Lebanese sisters did not leave the convent after 4 o'clock for 7 years in this community because of their fear of what would happen to them because of the reprisals that were being brought down upon them by the PLO."

In Sidon, the same comments as well. "We virtually did not have control. Now, we do not like the Israelis being here, and we want them to leave, but we frankly see them as a people who provided us with an opportunity to do what we really want to do, and that is bring our country back together again."

Now, that view was almost universally expressed. I cannot tell you, obviously, in West Beirut. I think the feelings are quite different than that. But again, it was expressed differently but still the same view came through loud and clear from Moslem and Christian alike. That was the second point.

The sense of what can be done. There is a strong feeling that Israel not engage in further military activity to capture West Beirut. They are strongly opposed to that, and they really hope that Phil Habib will be successful in his efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the PLO withdrawal.

But they also happen to feel that those of us in the West may not quite understand how clever Yassir Arafat is politically and that he is a master at buying time in a situation, and that we ought to be sensitive to that. That does not mean we ought to stop negotiating to try and achieve his withdrawal, but that he will be the master in terms of turning what would otherwise be a military loss into a great political victory for himself, and we ought to be more conscious of that.

And they suggested that Phil Habib stay at it. And the general consensus was, as long as Phil Habib was there and as long as Phil Habib said I think there is a chance of achieving a peaceful withdrawal, the Israelis would not go in militarily, and there was a possibility of success. If Phil Habib walks away and throws up his hands, then they feel all else is lost. But as long as he is there, the Israelis will not go in militarily.

Now, that is a perception they feel.

So with those things in mind—and you both have broader experience than I do in this region, I would like you to just comment on whether or not you think those observations are fallacious, an exaggeration or correct.

Mr. BALL. Senator, with regard to the comments that you made on the stridency of my statement I am not sure that I would take

issue with you very strongly. My statement was deliberately stated in strong terms simply because it is a side of the case that has not been presented clearly in this country. To the extent that I may have stated it in more emotional terms than is customary in the things that I write, it was for that very reason.

I want to shock people. I want Americans to realize that we face a problem in dealing with a nation which is very close to us, which we substantially maintain with our assistance but still have no control over what it does. Thus we are constantly taken by surprise and, therefore, our efforts at a coherent diplomacy in the area are rendered nugatory.

I think that is a point that ought to be made. I acknowledge your suggestion that perhaps less strident rhetoric might have been persuasive. On the other hand, I am dealing with a case where the other side has been stated again and again and again with what seems to me an excessive passion and one sometimes has to counter passion with passion.

I think my whole record would show that I am sympathetic to the problems of Israel and I have been from the very beginning. But I think that if we are going to have a decent relationship, we have to tell one another what we are going to do, it is wrong to talk about Israel as a great ally when that great ally is going off behind our back and doing something and letting us find it out later. That just will not work.

So if we are going to achieve a self-respecting relationship—and I certainly hope we will—then there have to be some ground rules. This is the primary point I was trying to make in my statement.

Now on the situation in Lebanon, I am fascinated by what you say. I have been in Lebanon myself a number of times, beginning in the 1950's at a time when there was some stability. It has broken periodically. It has broken down in part because demography has interfered.

The Shiite element, for example, has been increasing at a more rapid rate than the Maronites, yet disparities of that kind were not reflected in the original formulae which were based on a weighting of populations as they then existed.

I certainly hope Lebanon can achieve stability. I would think, however, that one ought to look very carefully at what the Israeli ultimate objectives are. Do they want, as they have suggested, to maintain a cordon sanitaire of up to 25 miles and fill it with Israeli settlements as they have on the West Bank? I suspect they do. And when I say "they," I am talking about the Begin government. I am not talking about the Israeli people generally because I find as many splits of opinion in Israel today as anywhere.

This is about where I come out. If the Lebanese people can put together a government, then God help them. Certainly they ought to be free of all foreign influence, including the PLO and the Israelis and everybody else.

I think we have to make very sure, though, that we do not assist in getting the PLO out and find the Israeli army is still there 12 months from now, not necessarily in the area of Beirut but certainly in the south, south of the Litani.

Mr. ALLEN. Senator Dodd, your information is extremely important because it is both recent and based on your first-hand observations

while in the region. Having seen your reports on evening television news and other reports of your activities, I was very happy that you were able to share them again here in an encapsulated form. I think it is extremely useful to remember that the Lebanese people themselves, as I indicated in my statement today, strongly feel that they have been liberated from an oppressor.

You did not convey a sense of the Lebanese people, at least those with whom you spoke, feeling that they have merely substituted one oppressor or occupier for another. That fact needs to be emphasized.

You mentioned the aspects of physical safety that concerned ordinary citizens in Lebanon. It was through Lebanese intelligence sources that information concerning the full extent of the huge arms buildup taking place in southern Lebanon was conveyed to the Israelis; the Israelis themselves did not believe it.

On July 7 Prime Minister Begin said that Israel had captured ten times more Russian weapons than were previously reported by Israel intelligence. What was all that war materiel for? It was certainly not there to serve as a staging depot for transshipment elsewhere.

Senator DODD. I think Israel has made a mistake in this and, by the way, Senator Levin and I were highly critical with them about this. They have taken a small percentage of the captured weaponry and they put it on display in an amusement park in Tel Aviv. That is virtually what it is. They sell balloons and so forth and there is a representation or so of the equipment that they discovered.

I think they ought to take all that they found and spread it all out in an open field somewhere and let the world see it—1,200 trucks, 5-ton trucks—1,200 5-ton trucks were filled with just small arms ammunition. That is just one example of the quantities coming out of there. Boxes marked "bulldozer parts," "agricultural equipment"—virtually 10 times what the expected quantities were.

We asked the mayor of Sidon whether he was surprised by the quantity of arms. He says I was surprised not only as to quantity but to quality. There are German semiautomatic rifles, that have never been sold to anybody that are on display that the PLO had. It was absolutely staggering the amount of equipment that has been unearthed and they are still discovering and still finding it.

Senator PELL. Isn't it correct, too, that there were some cases of rifles that had been sent to Saudi Arabia?

Senator DODD. U.S. rifles?

Senator PELL. Yes; U.S. rifles.

Senator DODD. Well, there are not enough to really warrant a suggestion that somehow there was collusion. They are examining that issue by tracing serial numbers, but there was no great quantity that would substantiate the argument that the Saudis were supplying weapons in any great numbers to the PLO.

Mr. ALLEN. One more comment, Senator, on what you said.

The extensive training that was going on in Sidon, which was really one of the centers for training for foreign forces from all over the world, obviously caused great concern among the Israelis, as it should have caused great concern in the U.S. Government and elsewhere.

In summary, I associate myself with virtually everything that you have said and I would conclude, in responding to your invitation to comment, that stridency in the policy debate here is going to break

down the conditions for rational discourse on a pressing strategic problem for U.S. foreign policy and for our long-range interests.

It is just in the form of a hearing such as this that the issues can be examined publicly. There is no such comparable forum in the executive branch. The citizens do not have the opportunity to make their views known, and if they do sometimes they are often discarded because they are not invented within the bowels of the administration's bureaucratic machine.

So I, for one, welcome the opportunity to expound my own views and analyze it from my perspective and I think that the service that you perform here in this hearing is indeed important for the Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd, very much.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, by the way, there will be a report that Senator Levin and I will be filing very shortly. We are in the midst of preparing it and should have it by next week. The committee will have it as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. We look forward very much to that indeed. I think it is very valuable, particularly when there is a reluctance on the part of any administration to testify publicly in the midst of something like this, to have both of you with your invaluable background and experience appear in public to discuss these issues.

I would like to examine where we go in the future. What are the opportunities we can take from the current dilemma? What is the future of the West Bank? Where will the PLO go? What is the implication of the Iran-Iraq war? Perhaps we could have very brief answers to a couple of these questions?

During Prime Minister Begin's stormy meeting in this room, a number of Senators asked him whether the Israeli army used cluster bombs against civilian populations in contravention of agreements between our two countries. The Prime Minister said he found the use of such a weapon reprehensible. He did not know about their use but he would find out.

He has been asked repeatedly by both the executive branch and by the members of this committee for a report. We have not received such a report. Do either of you have any knowledge about the use of cluster bombs? What should the United States of America do if the agreements have been violated?

Mr. ALLEN. Senator, I have no information that such bombs were used, and if they were, all deliberate pressure that could be brought to bear on anyone who would use them against civilian populations should be brought without further delay.

Mr. BALL. My answer to that, Mr. Chairman, would be the general comments that I made this morning, that I think apart from cluster bombs, the whole question of using these——

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Can Secretary Ball be heard in the back of the room?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, but the microphones have to be spoken directly into.

Mr. BALL. I am sorry. Apart from the issue of cluster bombs, the whole question of the use of our weapons given them for self-defense purposes ought to be raised, not with the idea that we do what we did

to the Turks and stop shipments for 2 years, but that if they do it again they will get the same treatment as Turkey.

I think this is essential, but again this goes to the whole question of being taken by surprise and advance notice. I think that we cannot go on in a relationship where we do not know what the other side is going to do. We always telegraph what we are going to do and we tell them, and then suddenly we wake up some morning and discover that their army has jumped off in another direction and that the United States had better come and help.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ball, the MOU [memorandum of understanding] was suspended. That was not implemented by the Reagan administration. In December 1981, Secretary of State Haig had lunch with this committee to discuss the suspension. Not a word of dissent was expressed on that decision. I have not heard any Senator indicate that it should be restored. It has not been restored to date.

What would you feel would be the implications if at this time or any time in the near future the MOU on strategic cooperation were restored by this administration in the light of present conditions in that area?

Mr. BALL. I have always felt that we had to do one of two things with regard to Israel and we have done neither of them. We either had to get closer to Israel so that we had a common understanding and we really did act as allies or we had to disengage ourselves from the kind of paternalistic position that we have.

To go through with the memorandum of understanding, is possible only if there is a whole revolution in the relationship so that we are confident Israel will not go off unilaterally, where we have some agreement on what the general strategy for the area may be—and that would certainly not be the strategy of the Begin government.

This is the problem. If we seriously focused on the conditions necessary for a memorandum of understanding, the Begin government would never accept it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Allen, how do you feel about it?

Mr. ALLEN. Senator Percy, I think the move to implement strategic cooperation through the MOU now in suspension would be wise. We need every vehicle of cooperation and dialog at our disposal so that we can effectively conduct the kind of persuasive diplomacy with Israel that we need to conduct, particularly at this time.

I would not be willing to recommend to the administration that we distance ourselves in any way from Israel now. I think we need to intensify the dialog and the level of cooperation from top to bottom and, if in fact we are to pursue a policy of getting closer to Israel, which I think is in our vital interest, then this memorandum of understanding would serve as a vehicle for achieving it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Allen, under the Carter administration negotiations were undertaken for the sale on a concessional basis of 75 F–16's to Israel. There has been some discussion as to whether that should be implemented by the Reagan administration now. What would be your feeling as to whether formal notification of the sale should be sent to us? What would the implications of this decision be as it affects the region and as it affects our role in the world?

Mr. ALLEN. My feeling on that issue, Senator Percy, is, with due respect for appropriate timing, and with the intention of not inflam-

ing or sending a confusing signal to anyone, that we should proceed with the sale of additional aircraft to Israel.

Mr. BALL. Well, I do not really see how you could do that without sending a signal to the world which would be a very unfortunate signal right now. It would simply add to the pile of suspicion and be one more confirmation that the United States was really a party to this whole adventure.

In view of the fact that a great many of the nations of the world condemn it as an inhumane affair, I do not think we ought to be in that position. We must impose some kind of a reprimand to show that Israel cannot go off on these adventures on their own without advance notice. It would be very, very useful for us to say that these new planes are abandoned for the time being, but later it might be considered.

I certainly would not send them at the moment.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, on that one question that you just asked, in response might I interject just a question at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, surely.

Senator DODD. The whole notion of prior notification is one I raised with our Ambassador, Sam Lewis, in Israel and I raised it with Israeli officials. Their response was that it has been historically something that the United States has never asked for and the general feeling is would not want to ask for. Do we really want as a matter of foreign policy to be in a position where we require that any time a nation—in this case Israel—which possesses U.S. military equipment must seek our permission before there is any use of it?

Doesn't that in fact create the situation that if in fact they use it and in one instance, for instance, do not require that permission, that we have created even further the impression that we dictate all of the actions that Israelis take? Wouldn't it be more of a hamstringing kind of thing in terms of foreign policy than actually an asset?

Mr. BALL. I do not believe it, Senator. What occurs right now is that we are the prisoner of Israel rather than the other way because they are in a position to take actions without telling us that stultify or destroy any coherent policy on our part. They call the tune and we dance to it. I find that quite unacceptable.

Certainly they would like to have total freedom of action, but they do not have total freedom of action. They depend on us for $2.5 billion a year. That is not total freedom of action. You cannot have that kind of relationship without some mutual commitments. I do not want to trust the future of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East to the Begin government. It is as simple as that.

I have no confidence that their conception of Israel's national interest, which I think is a wrong conception, is in any way congruent with our own conception.

Senator DODD. Even though they successfully negotiated the Camp David peace accord with Egypt? Wasn't that a major breakthrough?

Mr. BALL. It was a major breakthrough. It was done with very great difficulty by the United States and only with an enormous investment of resources on our part, but they have totally ignored the second part of the agreement, which was a serious effort to work out an autonomy formula for the West Bank.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Allen, you have indicated, if I recall correctly, that there is a compelling case for feeling that there has been a violation of the agreement to date in Lebanon. Let's presume that the threat to use force by Israel against West Beirut is implemented and there is an invasion of West Beirut by the Armed Forces of Israel using our weaponry, would you feel then that the law should be implemented which would involve cutting military assistance to Israel?

Mr. ALLEN. The question is a difficult one, as you well know. I think it is necessary, first of all, to determine whether or not such a remaining military action would, in fact, require equipment made in the United States. If it does not, we would, of course, be powerless to do anything about it except through the good offices of diplomacy and persuasion and other pressures that could be brought to bear if it were to result in that kind of carnage.

Even though it appears that the case is compelling that the equipment may be used for purposes that we may deem offensive, the Israelis would certainly insist that they are merely completing what for them was a defensive action, namely resolving the problem of the PLO in West Beirut.

I do not know how effective suspension of military deliveries would be. I also believe that such a suspension or termination of aid would not last very long.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure that I clearly understood whether you believe there already is a compelling case or further Israeli actions against the strongest warnings are necessary before a violation of American law has occurred?

Mr. ALLEN. Given that choice, I would not be prepared to recommend that the law be implemented at this halfway stage of the operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think we have very compelling interests in the removal of the PLO from West Beirut and the Syrians from Lebanon. I do not see an inconsistency in our policy by applying the law at that late stage. I also do not believe U.S. equipment would necessarily be required to achieve the military objectives of ejecting the PLO from West Beirut.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Ball, can you conceive under any condition in which Israeli forces could occupy West Beirut when U.S. equipment would not be used? I ask this question simply to be assured that our friends in Israel do not make a miscalculation. In your judgment, under present law, would we be compelled to suspend aid?

Mr. BALL. Well, I cannot imagine that the Israeli Army and Air Force would be in a position where they could carry out this enterprise without some American equipment being involved. There would be a great problem of sorting it out, it is all mixed up. Israel may have a tank, but it has an American gun on it. I would think it would be a fantasy to believe that this could be done.

I would not think that that would be the central condition, however. If the Israelis go into West Beirut, the United States is going to be held responsible in the eyes of the world. I do not want my country to be held responsible for the kind of carnage that would result. I simply think we have to make this point to Israel. We are in the unfortunate

situation with respect to the Israeli Government that we have been in for a very long time. We say things and we never follow up.

The result is they really pay little or no attention to our advice. We therefore put ourselves in a rather ridiculous position in the eyes of a great part of the world and it does harm to our diplomacy. It does harm to the prestige that we have around the world, which is the biggest single asset we possess.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

With regard to the PLO, Mr. Allen, you have said that no one wants them. That is understandable. This country has immigration laws that are very strict. No country on Earth will open its borders to anyone. I have always felt the greatest mistake Lebanon made, and I have discussed this over the years with Lebanese officials and different Lebanese governments, was allowing the Palestinians to establish a government within a government. When in Lebanon, I saw gun emplacements and a Palestinian government in the center of Beirut. No single Lebanese civilian or elected official is allowed to enter these Palestinian areas. It is a government within a government. That is intolerable.

The Lebanese are paying a bitter price for this now. But they opened the doors. They unfortunately opened up the problem for themselves. Now it is understandable that other countries do not want the PLO, but there is a problem on which 4.5 million Palestinians and 100 million Arabs are united—the Palestinians ought to have a homeland. They ought to have some place that they can call their own.

That, of course, gets down to the West Bank and resuming full autonomy negotiations. Do you believe that this is the time, particularly considering yesterday's New York Times report that a senior official of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, presumably speaking on behalf of the Palestinian National Council, said that the PLO was prepared to recognize Israel "on a reciprocal basis." At long last, after 35 years of struggle, they are willing to recognize the sovereignty of Israel.

Is this a window of opportunity? What difference does that kind of statement make now and what would you think the United States Government and Israel should do about that?

Mr. ALLEN. Yesterday I heard your emphasis on this point Senator Percy, and at first blush I was heartened because I do believe it constitutes an opportunity. It is one of the essential conditions, as you well know, that President Reagan and others have insisted upon.

The CHAIRMAN. There are other conditions that I have always placed on this and that President Reagan has. It seems to be moving significantly in that direction now.

Mr. ALLEN. If this is authentic, then it should not be dismissed.

The earlier part of your remark is also very interesting. As I recall, there are some 500,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and they have come from various places. I believe that the matter of handling genuine refugees is an easier problem than that of handling the armed forces of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Some Lebanese believe that the presence of 500,000 Palestinian refugees, even if they are peaceful citizens, disturbs in a fundamental way the ethnic balance of the nation, and that therefore the obvious solution is to return those individuals to their place of origin involving many countries.

The point is that if the PLO is willing to recognize Israel and to acknowledge secure and internationally recognized Israeli borders, then you have a very major step toward solving the central problem.

It is odd, isn't it, that such a step should come only under these circumstances?

The CHAIRMAN. How do you feel about that part of my question, which is what should the U.S. Government do about this now? What should our role be? Should we just nod and say it is a good thing, or should we seize the opportunity and do something about it?

Mr. ALLEN. If it is, in fact, an authentic expression of the will of the PLO, then I think we should take note of it and indicate that it represents fulfillment of one of the conditions we have insisted upon for so long.

The CHAIRMAN. Taking note of it is one thing, but doing something concrete is another. We have always had some sort of contact just to keep intelligence sources appraised of what their thinking is. At this time, if circumstances appear to be favorable to their taking those necessary steps, should we begin conversations with them?

Mr. ALLEN. I would not consider the expression of the possibility described in the New York Times article which you emphasized yesterday to be sufficient ground to enter into direct contact with the PLO at the present time. But if there are more signs, then I would feel that this might indeed be a propitious time, after consulting with all of the parties concerned, and certainly after gaining the understanding of Israel, for some sort of contact to take place.

I never had much difficulty, Senator Percy, in understanding the position of the PLO. I received enough information while in office and through conversations with informed individuals to know that indirect contact already exists. We now have a form of contact: Ambassador Habib has adequate communications.

The CHAIRMAN. But we are dealing through third and fourth parties, which is terribly frustrating and sometimes a dangerous thing because of misinterpretation.

Mr. ALLEN. As long as discussion would not indicate recognition of the PLO, provided all these signs were genuine, and provided we had the assent and understanding of all the parties concerned, I should think it is something we should consider favorably.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say consult with the parties, are you saying that we should seek approval from Israel and give them the right of veto?

Mr. ALLEN. I do not think that the United States should ever be in a position of extending the right of veto to any nation in the matter of conducting the pursuit of its own vital interests. A veto would not be in order.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ball.

Mr. BALL. Of course, Mr. Chairman, what Mr. Allen says is exactly what we have done. We have accorded the right of veto. We did it in the Camp David accords in what I thought was a very unfortunate and ill-advised promise made on the last night of the negotiation, that we would not conduct discussions or serious negotiations.

My own feeling is that this is a false issue. In trying to bring peace historically again and again the two negotiating nations have each

vowed to destroy the other. But they negotiate and out of the negotiation each will recognize the other and live in peace.

Why should the PLO make an advance commitment that it will remove the protocol pledge to destroy Israel when absolutely nothing is offered by the other side? Mr. Begin has made perfectly clear that he has no intention whatever of ever providing even adequate autonomy, much less self-determination, to the PLO. It seems to me that if we are going to ask the PLO to give up what they regard as their one bargaining counter, we ought to ask the other side to give some advance assurance that out of this something could emerge.

But if Mr. Begin rules out self-determination to start with, if he rules out any territorial right in the West Bank and the Gaza strip and announces that they are already part of Israel and will stay that way, and if he reduces his autonomy promises down to the point where they are very little different from apartheid, requiring any precondition from the PLO is merely creating an obstacle to getting down to any serious resolution.

If we were to involve Arafat in a negotiation and after enough trading around, he saw some possibility of coming out with some promise of self-determination at the end of a long period, we would be on the way to peace. But if we sit back and say well, the PLO must in advance give up what, from their point of view, is their only bargaining weapon—they do not have anything else to bargain with—and they are promised nothing on the other side, it seems to me that we have created a false issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one last question, just a quick refinement on this. Should we press the Palestinians and the PLO to not only recognize the sovereignty of Israel and its right to live behind defensible borders and its right to live in peace but also accept U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 as virtually all Arab countries have? Even Syria in my last visit there in January, by implication, accepted that, which was the first time, I think, that they had actually done so.

Mr. BALL. I would think again that if you can say to them, look, if you are prepared to do this there is a serious possibility of something coming out to provide you with some kind of homeland or at least some possibility of self-determination, you do not have to make a firm commitment to the result. But right now the Israeli Government indicates they will get nothing significant out of it.

Then what happens? The Israelis have said absolutely no. They are not going to permit anything that the PLO wants.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you comment on that also, Mr. Allen. Do you not think this is the time to breathe some life into the full autonomy talks and get those back on track?

Mr. ALLEN. I do indeed, and the answer to your question is yes. This is the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a point or two. I think it is very worthwhile to have both of you here this morning to share your thoughts with us on this situation.

I just would like to point out, if I could, what I started out by saying, and that is I presume tonight if we do not get the full weight of the debate or the discussion here, we will end up with 20, 30 or 40 seconds or so of that which is going to be most dramatic. My concerns or fears are that it is that level of rhetoric that tends to divide rather than to help us seek some answers to these things.

There are a number of points with which I take issue with my friend Mr. Ball—and I mean my friend because I have a great deal of respect and regard for his ability. I think we underestimate the Israelis. If we think for 1 second that their commitment to the survival of the State of Israel is dependent upon the shipment of U.S. military equipment, we terribly misread and underestimate the commitment of that State to survive and defend itself.

Whether or not they receive F–15's or F–16's or other U.S. military equipment, the State of Israel will go it alone if it has to, and that much is absolutely sure. I think it is a total underestimation to assume that we have a veto power over their actions. I think we can have an influence with them and I think we have had one.

But to assume that they would somehow not take as seriously as they do the threat that they face and have faced over 34 years is a gross misinterpretation of their commitment to survive. I think it is important in this context.

While the statement yesterday by one of the leaders of the PLO is important and my hope would be that Menachem Begin would jump all over that statement and try to prove in effect the veracity of the statement, I do not know whether he has done so or someone in his government has done so as yet, but I would strongly urge that they do that. We will find out very quickly how serious the offer is.

That is one good way of finding out. I think it ought to come from Israel and not come from the United States. That is the one quick way of finding out whether or not it is accurate. But I do think it is important to remember that it is the same organization—and I do separate the PLO from the Palestinians. It is this organization that cheered the assassination of Anwar Sadat, that called for his assassination long before it occurred, that denounced entirely the Camp David peace process and the accords.

Who would have believed that there would have been a peace treaty between the State of Israel and the State of Egypt considering the hostilities that have existed between those two nations?

Who would have believed that a Menachem Begin could ultimately achieve a peace treaty and return captured territory, the last part of it going on April 25, the Sinai, for really nothing in return, when you consider it—virtually nothing in return, giving up a very important strategic position—the energy resources of the Sinai—all for the commitment that there would be peace between those two peoples? I think that was a remarkable achievement and the best piece of evidence that I know of that Israel is desirous of peace.

If in fact the statements by the PLO yesterday are accurate, I suspect that may breathe the new life that Senator Percy talks about into negotiations that will be meaningful on the autonomy talks. My hope is that that will occur. But I do think it is important to keep those two points in mind—that Israel is committed to its own survival and will do so with or without U.S. military assistance.

I think it is a misconception to assume that they will not, secondly, they have demonstrated a willingness to make peace with an enemy in the region. I do not think that piece of evidence ought to be lost or forgotten in the debate over whether or not there is a commitment on their part to withdraw from Lebanon and to seek peace with those who have been the traditional enemies in the region.

Mr. BALL. I would suggest, Senator, that there is a qualitative difference between making peace and returning the Sinai and making peace with the Palestinians. This is the one comment I would make on what you say. I think that there is no great desire on the part of Mr. Begin to find a solution to the Palestinians.

I think that they would not be conducting a settlements policy that would preclude any kind of home for the Palestinians on the West Bank, for example, if this were serious.

Senator DODD. There were settlements in the Sinai as well.

Mr. BALL. Yes, I know, but the Sinai did not have the same meaning. The Sinai was a big piece of desert. The Palestinian issue is very different. It involves people who were uprooted. That is why the Palestinian issue and the need to find some solution for it is a very different issue from the issue of the Sinai.

Mr. ALLEN. Senator Dodd——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, may I interrupt for just a moment? Regretfully I have a luncheon that started at 12 with the Illinois delegation and I had better get over there before they adjourn and make a report.

I wonder, Senator Glenn, would you mind completing the hearings for me? I want to thank both of you very much indeed for an extraordinary morning of testimony. It has been very valuable. Thank you.

Mr. ALLEN. I would make just one remark, Senator Dodd. You have indicated that Israel is not only willing but capable of taking a risk for peace and has demonstrated it by its actions. That is absolutely clear to me and I share those views. I think that that is a harbinger of good things to come because Israel has demonstrated this willingness.

I had the opportunity to visit, for example, the air bases in the Sinai which had to be dismantled when the turnover occurred. Those were important assets. The control of the natural resources, the hydrocarbons that you mentioned, was also a key consideration. I have faith and confidence in Israel's ability and willingness to pursue the path of peace.

Senator DODD. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN [presiding]. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I am sorry I could not be here for all of this morning's session. The part that I was here for has been very illuminating to me. Does the staff have any questions that they would like to cover before we leave?

[No response.]

Senator GLENN. The hearing will recess, subject to the call of the chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

O